Infrastructure project finance in Asia. by Leung, Ada Nga Ting. et al.
INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECT FINANCE IN ASIA 
by 
LEUNG ADA NGA TlK(i 
( 梁 雅 婷 ） 
TSANG HIN K W O K ]M ‘ f 
( 曾 獻 國 ） … —..、-
MBA PROJECT REPORT 
Presented to 
The Graduate School 
. ½ I 
In Partial Fulfillment of 
the Requirements for the Degree of 
MASTER OF BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION 
TWO-YEAR MBA PROGRAMME 
THE CHINESE UNIVERSITY OF HONG KONG 
May 1996 
统 系 館 書 圖 \ ^ 
0 9 DEC i ^ J o j 
UNIVERSITY / M / J 
\& \^LI0aARY SYSTEM/^ 
丨 W 
i , A iu 
UA 
APPROVAL 
Name: Tsang Hirj Kwok 
Leung Ada Nga Ting 
Degree: Master of Business Administration 
Title of Project: Infrastructure Project Finance in Asia 
^ ^ • 
广 Dr. Larry Lang / 
Date A p p r o v e d : ^ 7 ^ 
i 
ABSTRACT 
The explosion of the "Asian economic miracle" and the explosion in 
infrastructure demands that followed caused financiers to rush into the area to take 
advantage of the increasing demands for project finance. However, many were 
scorched in the very heat of their enthusiasm. Expecting the same set of 
straightforward project financing principles and structures to apply in Asia as in the 
west, these early participants failed to address those particularly Asian issues crucial to 
the ultimate success or failure of the projects such as a lack of a well-defined legal and 
regulatory framework and the introduction of individual political and country risks. 
In short, true project financing cannot be said to exist in Asia since the 
ambiguities associated with the responsibilities and credit worthiness of the different 
players in the project framework do not lend themselves well to the traditional practice 
of allocating project risks amongst tHe various parties. As a result, in addition to the 
promises of fixture cash flows, project debt financing must be further secured on other 
promises such as sovereign guarantees or corporate guarantees. 
However, as these guarantees have become much more difficult to attain in 
recent years, financiers must experiment with new contingencies. For some, such as in 
the case of New World, llie developer has resorted to what is essentially, a suboptimal 
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financing structure conqjosed of a major proportion of project equity financing, while 
for others, such as Huaneng Power Intemational, the developer has turned to 
increasingly more sophisticated and innovative structures to take into consideration 
every aspect of project risk. Through our study of these two cases, we discover one 
inqjortant lesson, project success is not dependent on the level of sophistication in a 
project structure while project failure is not the result of an individually suboptimal 
structure. Rather, to be successM in Asia, a project financing structure must 
essentially be a marriage between the investors'/sponsors' needs, resources, and 
purposes with the constraints and demands of the Asian operating environment. 
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The explosion of the "Asian economic miracle" which has overstrained and 
overwrought the existing infrastructures in the region, has translated to an explosive 
demand for infrastructure projects. This phenomenon in turn, has translated to an 
explosive demand for project financing as such unprecedented levels of financing needs 
could not be met by the traditional sources of public sector financing. In response to 
this opportunity, a number of US and foreign banks rushed into the territory. 
However, this burst of enthusiasm soon cooled; unable to derive any economic 
benefits despite immense efforts, such an influx was soon followed by a mass exodus. 
What went wrong? These participants came to Asia expecting to apply the 
same set of straightforward project financing principles and structures which had so 
well served the west. However, Asia is not the west. All those assumptions of a well-
defined legal and regulatory framework to address such issues such as tax, inqjort 
controls, conversion and repatriation of profits and commercially based tariffs which 
permit a reasonable return on investment, are ambiguous and often altogether 
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nonexistent in the developing economies of Asia. Moreover, new issues such as 
country and political risks enter into to confound and muddle the project financing 
picture. Therefore, it is very difficult to convince lenders to lend to a project on a pure 
non-recourse basis in this region. 
In short, in Asia, true project financing does not exist. For this reason, we 
cannot expect to obtain the same levels of leveraged investments found in equivalent 
projects in the west, and moreover, cannot judge the relative success or failure of a 
project financing in the same ligjit. Finally, even if a project is able to adopt a basically 
superior structure on paper; the results may even prove devastating when the time 
arises to test the enforceability of the detailed contracts. 
To explore this idea, in this study, we will present two cases: New World 
Development Con^any Ltd. and Huaneng Power International, Inc. In the first case, 
New World adopts a project financing structure, (one with a high level of project 
equity financing rather than project debt financing) which when compared to structures 
in the west, seems unusually suboptimal. In the second case，Huaneng Power 
International, the company adopts a unique and superior financing structure, one with 
the characteristic of being "interactive", that is，the level of debt financing would 
actually positively affect rather than mq)air fiiture equity financing as the debt-to-equity 
ratio swells. What we discover from these two studies is that in Asian project 
financing, the consequences can be profoundly different from the results in the west. 
Structures seen as suboptimal in the west may prove successful in Asia, while 
structures seen as superior may prove to be self-defeating. 
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CHAPTER H 
NEW WORLD DEVELOPMENT CO. LTD. 
introduction 
Thesis 
In traditional project finance in the west, due to the high costs of external ftuids 
and thus, the relatively high levels of project debt financing (on average 65-85% of the 
total project cost), ROE, rather than ROI is the proper measure of return on a given 
project. Because oftentimes, project borrowing costs would exceed the return on 
investment (e.g. borrowing costs = 15%，while ROI = 12%), the only way for 
investors to make profits would be for them to greatly leverage their investments to 
boost up ROE. Therefore, to be successful, projects must be financed with a very high 
level of project debt financing; if financed primarily by equity, projects would either, in 
the less serious case, cause corporate firnds to be used suboptimally, or in the serious 
case, cause investors to actually lose money, in which case, the projects would not 
even proceed. Finally, a high level of project equity financing would entail greater 
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risks for investors since they would have more to lose in the situation of project non-
profitability or in the more severe case of project default. 
In our following discussion of New World Development Ltd., we discover an 
anomaly to the single relationship of high project debt financing equals to project 
success and profitability. New World finances its individual projects almost purely 
with equity fiinds. Moreover, as if this seemingly suboptimal use of corporate funds 
were not enough, it seems to unnecessarily sacrifice its upward profit potentials 
through an obsessive concern over protecting its corporate equity investments. 
However, through this case, we discover that in fact, the traditional project finance 
concept of high leverage and returns based on ROE does not directly apply here 
because in doing business in China, project success means achieving an acceptable rate 
of return on investment and getting the principle investment back as soon as possible, 
even at the expense of sacrificing all upward profit potentials. Moreover, the optimal 
levels of project debt vs. project equity financing cannot be simply determined on 
ROE alone; a proper financing structure depends on matching investors'/sponsors' 




New World Development Ltd., one of the top 15 companies listed on the Stock 
Exchange of Hong Kong in terms of market capitalization, with a capitalization of 
HK$43 million (US$6 billion) as of August 31, 19951, is in the business of property 
investment and development, hotel investment and management, transport and 
infrastructure, telecommunications, and a host of other businesses ranging from 
department stores, property mortgages, finance and insurance services, television 
broadcasting, convention centre management, membership club operations, commerce 
trading, manufacturing, etc. Infiastructiire projects are held under subsidiary, New 
World Infrastructure Ltd. The following is the operational structure of the 
conglomorate. 
) ‘ 
1 Credit Lyonnais Securities (Asia) Limited. New World Infrastructure Limited Placing 
and New Issue, October 17，1995, pp. 108. 
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Figure 1 New World Development Operational Structure 
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As of the year ended June 30，1995, the Group's performance by Principal 
Activities take the following characteristics2: 
2 New World Development Co. Ltd. Annual Report 1995, pp. 13. 
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Figure 2. Turnovers & Contributions of Various Segments for New World 
Development 
Turnovers & Contributions of Various Segments for New World 
Development 
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In terms of Geographic Breakdown as of June 30, 1995，the figures are as 
follows3: 
3 New World Development Annual Report 1995, pp. 46. 
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Figure 3.Turnover & Contributions; of New World Development by Region 
Turnovers & Contributions of New World Development by Region 
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Entrance into the Power/Infrastructure Business 
Started out as a property developer, New World has, over time, strategically 
expanded its core business operations to include hotels, and finally, infrastructure. The 
expansion into infrastructure was almost unconscious; it was the result of the New 
World Group's diversification into China in the early 1980's. Through taking part in 
the development, construction, and management of the China Hotel in Guangzhou, 
New World established business relationships with the various provincial and municipal 
government authorities which paved the way for the Group's entrance into the 
infrastructure business. Thus, when the Guangzhou City People's Government 
approached and invited the developer to participate in the construction of the 22 km 
dual three-lane GuangzJiou City Northern Ring Road toll expressway in Guangzhou, a 
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joint venture contract signed in 1990 to handle the project marked the starting point 
for New World's diversification into infrastructure development. The structure of this 
project has since served as a blueprint for the Group's participation in later road 
infrastructure projects. 
Following recent restructuring activities in 1995, the infrastructure investments 
in Hong Kong and China have been spun off into a separately held and publicly-traded 
con^pany: New World Mrastructure Ltd. (NWIL). Below are the details of the spin-
off and offering. 
The Spin-off of New World Infrastructure Ltd. (NWIL) 
The spin-off of New World Development's infrastructure subsidiary, New 
World Infrastructure began with the authorization of 2,000,000,000 shares for issue 
and the injection of infrastructure assets with an appraised value of HK$7.865 billion 
(see Appendix 1 for the actual projects). Three parties provided these assets: New 
World Development Company Limited, New World China Investment Limited (a 50% 
owned associated conqjany of New World), and Feng Ming Investment Limited, and in 
return for their injections, were awarded shares in the new corr^any accordingly. 
Below is a diagram illustrating these transactions. 
4 Credit Lyonnais Securities (Asia) Limited. New World Infrastructure Limited 
Placing and New Issue, October 17, 1995, pp. 60. 
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Figure 4. The Formation of New World Infrastructure Ltd. 
New World Development Co. Ltd. 
A 
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New World Development then made plans for an Offering of shares whereby 
the total number of shares issued would increase to 727,827,340, divided into the 
following: 
Figure 5 NWBL IPO (a) 
565,827,340 Shares in issue and to be issued pursuant to the Reorganization: 
468,256,117 New World Development Conqjany Limited 
94,938,129 New World China Investment Limited 
2,633,094 Feng Ming Investment Limited 
162,000,000 Shares to be issued pursuant to the Share Offer 
16,200,000 Initial Public Offering in Hong Kong (10% of the 
Offering) 
145,800,000 International Placing (90% of the Offering) 
727,827,340 Total Shares Outstanding After the Offering 
An over-allotment option ("Green Shoe" Option) of up to 24,300,000 
additional shares was made available to cover over-allotments in the placing and/or 
over-subscriptions in the new issue. 
The final initial public offering issue price was fixed at HKS12.75 per share, 
representing a price/earnings ratio of 27 times projected 1991 earnings. Due to the 
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good response by Hong Kong investors (an oversubscription of some 19.6 times), 
New World decided to increase the number of shares set aside for the Hong Kong 
initial public offering from 10% to 15% of the share offering (24,300,000 shares), and 
correspondingly, to reduce the international placement from 90% to 85% of the share 
offering (137,700,000 shares). Moreover, on the day of the listing, the company 
decided to partially exercise the "Green Shoe Option" by issuing an additional 
8,579,000 shares? bringing the total offering to 170,579,000 shares and raising a total 
of HK$2? 174,882,250, HK$2.058 billion of which comprised net proceeds for the new 
conqjany. With this offering, New World Development was left with a share of 67.9% 
of the issued share capital of NWIL. Credit Lyonnais then decided to exercise the 
"Green Shoe" over-allotment option of 24,300,000 shares in full by issuing another 
15,721,000 shares in November, bringing the total authorized and outstanding shares 
to 752,127,340 shares. Below illustrates the breakdown: 
Figure 6. NWIL BPO (b) 
2,000,000.000 Total Authorized Shares 
1,247,872,660 Authorized Shares Unissued 
565,827,340 Shares in issue and issued pursuant to the Reorganization 
162,000,000 Shares issued pursuant to the Share Offer 
24,300,000 Shares issued for IPO in Hong Kong 
137,700,000 Shares issued for International Placing 
24,300,000 Shares issued with exercise of the "Green Shoe" over-allotment 
option (with 8,579,000 issued at the time of the listing, of which 
4.9 million shares were placed, and another 15,721,000 shares 
issued in Nov.) 
752,127,340 Total Shares Outstanding After the Offering 
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Below is a diagram illustrating the various transactions: 
Figure 7. Formation of NWIL (b) 
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With the co呼letion of the "Spin-off", New World Development Conq)any 
Limited held a total of 468,256,117 of the subsidiary's shares directly, and another 
47,469,064.5 shares indirectly through its 50% stake in New World China Investment 
Limited, giving the Group control of 68.57% of the new concern. 
As a result of the spin-o£^ today, NWIL holds a well-structured portfolio of 
infrastructure development and investments all within the boundaries of Hong Kong 
and China spanning the development, operations, and management of toll roads, 
tunnels and bridges, electric power stations, container terminals, cargo handling and 
distribution facilities conqjlexes, and airports. Details of this portfolio are in Appendix 
2. 
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The Group's Strategy On Its Infrastructure Investments 
New World's strategy is to concentrate its infrastructure investments in high-
growth regions in China and Hong Kong. All the existing road projects are 
strategically located in two of the most inqjortant hubs in China's transportation 
networks: the Pearl River Delta and Wuhan. Likewise, the Group's power projects 
serve populated areas where there is a significant demand for power. 
In addition, the Group believes in investing only in projects which meet basic 
local needs and are considered by the PRC Governments as priority projects. By doing 
so, they believe that demand would be less adversely affected by economic downturns, 
approval and regulatory processes can be expediated, possibility of delays in 
conqjletion reduced, and investment incentives such as favourable tax treatment, the 
possibility of extending the joint venture term if a certain rate of return is not achieved, 
and the transfer of any currency devaluation risks to the joint ventures may be 
obtained. Moreover, by entering into partnerships with local PRC entities to invest in 
these projects, the Group is better able to meet these objectives. 
And finally, the Group believes in focusing on projects where it would be able 
to capitalize on the capabilities and experience of the Group. Concentrating its 
resources in Guangdong and Wuhan and engaging the services of its subsidiary, Hip 
Hfing which would allow the New World to obtain construction work and engineering 
consultancy services for its infrastructure projects at an arm's length basis, are 
exan^les of how the Group aims to achieve management synergy and complementary 
relationships in respect to its infrastructure investments. 
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Major Dates / Events 
Here follows the major events in New World's diversification into the Asian 
infrastructure industry since the holding con^any's incorporation in 1970: 
1970 Incorporates in May engaging in real estate development and property 
investment 
1972 Becomes listed in November by offering 96.74 million shares to the public 
Diversifies into construction and civil engineering works, hotel and theatre 
operations and travel agencies 
1980 Participation in the building of the China Hotel in Guangzhou 
1981 Joint ventures with a number of parties to create Asia Terminals Limited (ATL) 
1985 Acquires a 49% interest in Asia Terminals Ltd. which owns and operates 
Berth 3 ofKwai Chung Container Terminal 
1988 Acquires a 24% interest in a 30-year franchise to operate the Tate's Cairn 
Tunnel between Shatin and Kowloon wdiich became operational in July 1991 
Begins to involve in a number of infrastructure construction, power plants, 
highway projects and huge land development undertakings, in various regions 
in China 
1990 Joint-ventures with the Chinese authorities to construct the Guangzhou City 
Northern Ring Road became operational in Jan. 1994 
1991 Through Ready City Ltd., acquires a 13.84% indirect interest in Sea-Land 
Orient Terminals Ltd. 
15 
Takes a 50% equity stake in HRBD to obtain a 34.05% indirect interest in the 
Shenzhen-Huizhou Expressway project, which became operational June 1993 
1992 Undertakes some interest in the development of the Kwai Chung Container 
Terminal No. 9 project 
Enters into a Sino-foreign joint venture with GDGC for the construction of 
Zhujiang Power Station, Phase I, which became operational January 1994 
1993 NW China Inv. Ltd., a 50% owned associate engaged in China investments, 
obtains a listing on the Irish Stock Exchange 
Sino-cooperative JV with a number of PRC parties for the construction of 
Guangzhou-Zhuhai East-line Expressway 
Sino-cooperative JV with PRC parties for the construction of Roadway No. 
324 (Gaoyao Section), which became operational February 1994 
Joint-ventures with Wuhan Airport Comprehensive Development Corporation 
(WACD) to construct the Wuhan Airport Expressway, which became 
operational April 1995 
1994 Forms two Sino-foreign cooperative joint ventures for the building of Roadway 
No. 321 (Fengkai Section), which became operational March 1995, and 
Roadway No. 1964 (Zhaojiang Section), which became operational December 
1995. 
Subscribes for shares in WBC to obtain an interest in the Wuhan Bridge Project 
1995 Joint-ventures with PRC parties for the construction of Roadway No. 321 
(Deqing Section), which became operational December 1995 
Joint-ventures with PRC parties for the building of Roadway No. 1960 
(Guangning Section) in Zhaoqing (Guangdong) 
16 
Supplemental agreement for the building of provisional project, Zhujiang 
Power Station 圓 Phase n 
New World Infrastructure Ltd. becomes a separately listed con^any on 
October 27， 1995, offering 170,579,000 shares, issued at HK$12.75/share by 
way of a placing and a public offer，raising a total of HK$2.17 Billion 
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Anah/sis 
New World's Project-Financing Structure 
New World's projects are heavily financed by equity fimding, with little use of 
external project debt funding. Also, in many cases, the PRC partner's equity 
contribution is singly the piece of land or a previously finished section of the project; 
therefore, if we only take the actual cash expenditures to mean total cost by 
subtracting from the project cost the land contributions of the PRC partner, we may 
get slightly even more skewed financing ratios, particularly concerning the portion 
equity fimded by New World. For details of the financing ratios of the individual 
projects，please see Appendices 3 and 4. For a clearer picture of New World's 
financing structure, below is a chart showing how New World's consolidated financing 
portfolio of its PRC projects looks like5. We have shown both sets of ratios (based on 
Total Cost of the Project and based on Total Cash Expenditures Required in the 
Project) where applicable below: 
5 This consolidated financing portfolio includes all the PRC projects except for the 
Shenzhea-Huizhou Expressway where data is not available. 
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Figure 7 NWIL's Project Finance Ratios 
Total Cash Required 
Total Cost of Projects in Projects 
^ ^ ~ f K ~ % o f ~ A m a r t s f e %of 
Total Financing 12,367,067,000 100.000% 11,062,567,000 100.000% 
Required 
External Project 2,404,709,394 19.444% 2,404,709,394 21.738% 
Debt Financing 
Project Equity ~9,936,857,606 80.349% 8,632,257,606 78.032% 
Financing 
Other Project 25,500,000 0.002% 25,500,000 0.002% 
Financing 
Equity Financing ~3,852,187,456 31.149% 3,852,187,456 34.822% 
Provided by 
New World 
Development | ； 
Through this analysis, we can see that New World's project financing structure, 
19.444% Debt, 80.349% Equity in the case of total project cost, and 21.738% Debt, 
78.032% Equity in the case of total cash requirements required, for its PRC projects 
are widely different from the profiles we find in projects in the west where projects will 
be generally financed with 65% to 85% external debt. The in^lications of this 
deviation are serious. It means that New World's return-on-equity (ROE) ratios may 
be considerably lower than usual, indicating a likely suboptimal use of fiinds. The 
consequences of New World's lowered ROE due to high project equity financing are 
crucial, since in project finance, the key measure of investment returns is ROE, rather 
than retum-on-investment (ROI). This is because in projects, oftentimes, the 
sponsor's costs of borrowing could be greater than a project's return-on-investment. 
For project investors, profits are gained because of the high leverage associated with 
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their investment. However, in the case of New World, it is obvious this is not the case. 
Moreover, strangely enough, we also find that New World places caps on its projects' 
upward revenue/profit potentials; in the case of the Zhujiang Power Plant, all 
additional revenue/profits above the guaranteed minimum go to the local partner, while 
the company only receives the minimum contracted power purchase amount. 
In the face of all these unusual arrangements, the question arises as to why 
New World would choose to so "suboptimally" use its corporate fimds by undertaking 
such a "suboptimal" combination of debt vs. equity fimding in its individual projects 
and limiting its upward profit potentials? 
Possible Reasons Underlying the "Suboptimal" Project-Financing Structure 
The following are some possible reasons why New World would choose to use 
what on the surface seems to be a suboptimal mix of project debt vs. project equity 
financing project-financing structure: 
1. Strong financial affordability 
2. Lack of access to external project debt financing 
3. Corp orate Finance Policy does not welcome the use of external debt 
4. The structure is really not so suboptimal after all 
5. Infrastructure development is only a vehicle upon which New World can 
carry out its strategy in China 
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Strong financial affordabiiitv 
New World is a long-standing Hong Kong conglomerate with great financial 
clout. Although only average to slightly above average corr^ared to US companies in 
terms of Long-Term Debt-to-Equity ratios (US con^anies, Long-Term Debt-to-
Equity ratios average 25%), New World's ratios are considered low and very solid 
con^ared to most Hong Kong conq)anies in cortq)arable businesses. Below are the 
Group's ratios over the years: 
1995 1994 1993 1992 1991 1990 
28.91% 23.38% 16.56% 17.29% 21.84% 18.42% 
Moreover, the Group has behind it, a very large share of equity reserves (some two-
thirds of Total Assets) which can be used to firnd fiiture investments. Below are the 
figures of New World's equity reserves and total assets over the years: 
1995 1994 1993 1992 1991 
Reserves $45,892.6 $46,139.7 $34,740.6 $28,817.8 $22,509.2 
Total Assets $65,963.5 $62,598.1 $45,365.6 $38,247.8 $31,965.8 
Because of its strong financial resources, the company can afford to finance a 
large portion of its infrastructure projects with project equity financing. 
Lack of Access to External Project Debt Financing 
It is a known fact that local Chinese governments cannot give guarantees. 
Therefore, this right was reserved for the Chinese banks, such as the Bank of China. 
However, this situation changed on March 1, 1994，when a new set of regulations 
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came out forbidding banks from issuing guarantees. As a result, foreign banks / 
lenders which require these guarantees before making any syndicated loans have been 
unwilling to lend to projects in China. 
Although access to external project debt-financing has reduced greatly since 
China's new investment policies restricting the provision of sovereign guarantees, in 
the case of con^anies whose net asset value is greater than the amount of the loan, 
project debt-financing can be obtained by using the assets of the sponsoring company 
as the collateral thfough the method of counter-guarantees, in essence, fiill-recourse 
project debt-financing. 
New World Development with consolidated total assets of 
HK$65,963,500,000，and consolidated net assets of HKD$47,566,900,000 does have 
this option to obtain project debt-financing, and has exercised this right in the past as 
can be seen in their two projects: the Guangzhou City Northern Ring Road project 
and the Zhujiang Power Station • Phase I. In the former, New World obtained a 
US$97.5 million syndicated loan facility through providing guarantees by its wholly-
owned subsidiary, Hong Kong Island Development Ltd., while in the latter, it obtained 
a US$140 million syndicated bank loan through providing guarantees directly. 
Because project debt-financing can be achieved through the use of full-recourse 
loans guaranteed by the corrqjany, a lack of project debt financing in its project 
financing arrangements must largely be a conscious decision at the corporate level, that 
is, the company's corporate finance policy. 
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Corporate Finance Policy Does Not Welcome the Use of External Debt 
As a business "grown from scratch" from Dato' Dr. Cheng Yu-Tung and 
passed to son，Mr. Cheng Kar-Shun, Henry, the business is primarily one that is 
family-owned as can be observed in the family's interest, through Chow Tai Fook 
Enterprises, of 637,514,877 shares or approximately 39% of the conq>any’s 
outstanding shares. Moreover, as a large number of the directors, those who actually 
run the con^any, are the Cheng family members themselves, the directors would be 
extremely eager to protect the conq>any’s equity investments. Not surprisingly, 
bankruptcy would be a term much to be avoided. Thus, New World's corporate 
finance policy, to eliminate the threat of bankruptcy, would be strongly risk and debt 
adverse, and would thus keep a relatively high balance of equity in the conq>any's 
corporate finance structure. Proof of this unfavourable attitude towards external debt 
financing rests in the cono^any's relatively conservative gearing ratios (especially by 
Hong Kong standards). We present here again, the company's long-term debt-to-
equity ratios over the years: 
1995 1994 1993 1992 1991 1990 
28.91% 23.38% 16.56% 17.29% 21.84% 18.42% 
Such a debt adverse corporate mentality would of course directly result in an 
avoidance of debt at the project level especially since in China projects, all loans 
without the assistance of government guarantees, would have to be full-recourse 
meaning that they would lead to instant recourse on the parent con^any's assets in the 
case of credit default. Therefore, the con^any, in its corporate financing policy, places 
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a very explicit cap on the amount of debt that can be obtained at the project level. M 
the prospectus of New World Infrastructure, the Group's infrastructure spin-ofi^ we 
find the following peculiarity: 
The Directors believe the aggregate amount of loans which the New 
World Group will be required to guarantee in relation to the Projects 
and the fixture projects in the PRC which are currently under 
negotiation ., will increase substantially in the near fixture, but in any 
event will not exceed HKD$5,024 million.6 
The Structure is Really Not So Suboptimal After All 
A first glance at the financing structure of New World's projects and the high 
levels of project equity financing will seem to indicate a lower than average level of 
ROE. However, success or failure of a project cannot be determined by these rough 
indications. While seemingly suboptimal by general standards, there are two areas 
which indicate that the structure may not be so suboptimal after all. 
First of all, New World's projects present relatively short payback periods, 
meaning fiiads will be released for other uses quicker than in average projects. This 
also means that the ROE at first suggested may actually be much more attractive than 
that which we originally thought since the time value of money when factored into the 
picture could make a great difference. Therefore it transforms the traditionally single 
6 Credit Lyonnais Securities (Asia) Limited, New World Mrastructure Limited Placing 
and New Issue, October 17, 1995，pp. 112. 
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relationship between ROE and financial leverage obtained by high debt financing by 
adding to it the additional variable of shortened duration. 
Secondly, the other point which increases the attractiveness of the projects is 
the way the project arrangements address in detail all the factors which could adversely 
affect the deals. In risky China projects, ability to minimize and address default risks 
arising from political and other environmental uncertainties is crucial since attractive 
returns stemming from high leverage could turn to nothing due to some poorly 
predicted external factors. New World addresses issues such as foreign exchange 
risks and meeting minimum IRR's with a number of very detailed contracts. 
However, in an environment such as China, contracts in themselves to cover these 
risks are not enough; the only way to truly protect your investments is to pull out as 
soon as possible. New World performs just that by limiting repatriation of its principle 
equity investments with interest to a maximum number of years (generally five years of 
operations). However, to obtain its almost immune status to project risks, it must 
sacrifice its upward potentials to the local partner. 
I 
Infrastructure Development As Only A Chinese Investment Vehicle | 
Perhaps the most in^ortant reason for New World's seemingly suboptimal 
project arrangements where returns lack leverage and upward profit potentials are 
limited is the conglomerate's view of its infrastructure business in China. For New 
World, infrastructure development is not the end but the means upon which the 
con^any carries out its long-term strategy: property development in China. The 
conq>any does not look to infrastructure as the area from which it will derive its most 
attractive returns, but rather, looks at this business as one of the pathways from which 
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it can obtain first, most efficient and most effective access to its core business 
opportunities.. 
By analyzing'the conq>any's actions and statements, we come to the conclusion 
that New World's infrastructure developments fulfill two purposes: 
a) "sweetens" local governments into providing prime pieces of land for the 
Group's more lucrative commercial and residential developments at low 
prices 
b) establishes a base for steady long term growth by providing acceptable 
steady recurring income streams that will allow the Group to take 
I 
advantage of the most favourable market opportunities in its commercial 
and residential developments. 
The following two statements from the Group's Annual Report 1993 and the 
Group's Interim Report 1994/1995 respectively confirm our suspicions: 
The Group's policy on China investments is long term commitment. 
；I 
Between 20-25% of the Group's net asset value is designated for • 
I 
7 Although returns on commercial and residential developments could be highly 
lucrative, the industry is an extremely volatile one in which at certain points of time, 
profits could be immense, and at other times, destructional. Thus, the key to achieving 
consistently attractive and above average returns is to have the ability to ride the trends 
of the market. In order to do this, a developer would need to have the financial 
resources to simply wait out and not sell when the market is down，and sell only when 
the market is booming. By having a large strong and predictable earnings base such as 
infrastructure investments enables the Group to apply this cunning strategy. 
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investment in China with primary focus on infrastructure and property 
development projects. The Group's strategy is to invest in a diversified 
portfolio consisting of short, medium and long term projects, with the 
latter accounting for 50% of its investments. Through joint ventures 
with these China partners, the Group has been successfiil in 
accumulating more than 50 million square metres of land for various 
development purposes. The land will be developed in phases in 
• • 8 
accordance with market conditions. 
The investments in infrastructure provide a steady and recurring income 
which can be used to fond other developments during cyclical upturns. 
The Group has also in the past accumulated a sizable landbank at low 
cost for fiiture development. Tracts of land will be developed in phases 
in accordance with the prevailing market conditions. Apart from 
following well-defined financial criteria to evaluate potential 
investments in China, the Group normally invests in those projects 1 
|| 
which have government partners or considered government priorities. I 
Such investment strategies have enabled the Group to cultivate strong 
working relationships with all levels of government authorities in 
China.9 
From the above statements we can discover why New World would use a 
higher level of equity in its financing structure. There are basically two reasons. The 
8 New World Development Comqpany Limited Annual Report 1993, pp. 19. 
9 New World Development Con^pany Limited Interim Report 1994/95, pp. 8. 
^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ • • m � . . . : ‘ v . . . . , ：: 
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first is speed, As a developer interested in obtaining the most enviable pieces of rare 
land, it must move faster than other developers to take advantage of the opportunity; 
however, seeking debt financing without ftdl recourse is a very time-consuming 
process since sources such as e^qport credits take a minimum of six months to be 
processed. Since the duration of its equity investments is basically very short term, it 
would be acceptable to the Group to use this form of financing. The second 
explanation is greater confidence in its projects. Because its strategy of 
accommodating to the needs of its PRC partners will allow it to build up amiable 
relationships in the mainland, the Group feels more confident of its infrastructure 
investments and would be more comfortable in accepting the risks associated with a I： 
higher equity involvement. 
Also supporting our argument of New World's use of its infrastructure 
investments is the Group's policy regarding its property developments. We find that 
New World's property developments are divided into three different types: 
j 
a) Government Housing Projects, 
b) City Core Redevelopments, and P 
c) Commercial and Residential Developments. 
By using the first two types strategically, New World marvelously irrqproves its 
prospects in the area where it excels，that is，commercial and residential developments. 
Below, we discuss how the first two types of property developments contribute to 
New World's long-term China strategy of reaping unusually low-risk and magnificent 
profits on its core business of commercial and residential developments. 
a.) Government Housing Projects 
Government housing projects proceed as follows: 
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Each project consists of the development of moderate-quality subsidized 
housing built in accordance with government specifications as well as commercial 
properties. Apart from providing land free of premium, the Government bears the 
responsibility for underwriting sales of all units upon conq)letion. The advantages of 
all these projects will spread over to all parties concerned. The citizens receive proper 
housing, the local Government fiilfills its obligation of providing citizens better living 
conditions, and New World is guaranteed reasonable financial returns with low risk.10 
Participating in the basically low margin, unattractive ventures of developing 
government housing projects in China plays a crucial role in allowing New World to 
gain a tremendous portion of the most lucrative commercial and residential sites in 
China. By accepting these projects, it "sweentens" local governments into providing it 
with prized land for development. This is because in order to get promoted in China, 
local politicians must meet their political agenda of providing welfare to Chinese 
citizens, and of these agenda, low-cost housing is the most welcomed. Thus, in return 
for the favour, local governments will reward New World handsomely by providing it [| 
. I 
with prized land at very low cost, allowing the developer to accumulate substantial F 
high quality land banks in the locality. Such a strategy of using philanthropic l 
ettdeavours builds up warm political and joint venture relations to ensure success in 
fiiture cooperations by revealing to the Chinese that New World is not there to exploit 
them. 
b.) City Core Redevelopments 
10 New World Development Company Limited Interim Report 1994/1995, pp. 10. 
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Closely related to its strategy with regards to Government Housing Projects is 
its strategy related to city core redevelopments. As every retailer knows, the three 
biggest determinants to success are: location, location, and location. Therefore, 
understanding how developments will affect customer traffic flows is crucial. As a 
commercial/residential property developer, New World would be most concerned 
about obtaining sites that will be attractive to customers. By playing a key role in city 
core redevelopments, it would receive first hand exclusive knowledge about these sites 
L 
before its competitors, allowing it to reap magnificent profits later. Moreover, by 
taking upon the task of city core redevelopm纽ts, like the government housing profits, 
it would be able to nurture strong business relationships or "guanxi" with key contacts 
that would enable it to increase its land bank of prized sites at greatly reduced prices. 
Below is a description ofhow this sector of property development operates: 
New World is one of those first foreign developers to team up with local 
governments gaining exclusive rights to con^rehensively redevelop these areas. Under 
these joint ventures, the local governments provide large tracts of land in prime 
locations at low premiums and advantageous payment terms, with New World 
reciprocating in terms of capital and expertise. There are special investment incentives 
such as allowances for higher plot ratios and special reductions in relocation e邓enses 
provided to the joint ventures. In addition, New World is able to establish a degree of 
exclusivity and control through its close involvement in overall town planning, design 
and construction of these city cores. These joint ventures will pay off handsome 
dividends to both New World and the local governments. While the government 
redevelops aging city cores into modern city centres, New World is able to gain low-
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cost access to the most desirable land for its fixture property development activities to 
the effect of reaping attractive returns with minimal risk exposure.11 
Indeed, we have found that New World's land bank has grown considerably 
over the years. In the 1992/1993 Interim Report, it says: 
The major thrust of the Group's expansion is now in China. The Group has 
accumulated a total attributable land holding of over 25 million square feet [7.615 
• • • t • 12 I million square metres] in the key cities in China. 
By the time of the Annual Report 1993，this land holding has grown 
considerably: 
• The Group has accumulated, through JV's with these China partners, more 
than 50 million square metres of land for various development purpose. 3 
In our calculations, we totaled a land bank of 54,775,202 square metres.14 
By 1995, this portfolio has reached a total of 181,245,000 square feet15 
(55,207,227 square meters with the addition of the Guangzhou Dong Shan District 
Development Project whose site area has not yet been finalized. 
Following is a chart revealing the breakdown of the Group's investments in the 
PRC: 
11 New World Development Company Limited Annual Report 1995, pp. 17-18. 
12 New World Development Conoqpany Limited Interim Report 1992/1993, pp. 10. 
13 New World Development Company Limited Annual Report 1993, pp. 19. 
14 New World Development Company Limited Annual Report 1993，pp. 20-21. 
15 New World Development Company Limited Annual Report 1995, pp. 31-33. 
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I Figure 8. Joint Ventures in the People's Republic of China 
1994 1993 1992 
HK$Millions HK$Millions 
HK$MMons 
Analysis by activities 
Infrastructure 2,908.8 1,579.7 721.7 
Property developm't 3,526.2 1,370.0 17.5 
Others 777.5 395.3 360.9 
Total 7,212.516 3,345.017 1,100.118 
Note that as New World's strategy unfolds, we can see how after establishing a 
base in infrastructure projects, growth in property investments will greatly exceed 
those in infrastructure. On the other hand, it is interesting to note that of New World's 
infrastructure developments, almost all are already operational, and are already 
contributing cash: 
16 New World Development Company Limited Annual Report 1994, pp. 40. 
17 New World Development Con^any Limited Annual Report 1994, pp. 40. 
18 New World Development Conqjany Limited Annual Report 1993, pp. 45. 
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Figure 9. NWIL's Project Status 
Guangzhou City Northern Ring Road Operational 
Shenzhen-Huizhou Expressway (Hnizliou Section) Operational 
Guangzhou-Zhuhai East-line Expressway Under Construction 
Roadway No. 324 (Gaoayo Section) in Zhaoqing Operational 
Roadway No. 321 (Fengkai Section) in Zhaoqing Operational 
Roadway No. 1964 (Zhaojiang Section) in Zhaoqing Operational ； 
Roadway No. 3 2 j (Deqing Section) in Zhaoqing Operational 
Roadway No. 1960 (Guangning Section) in Zhaoqing Under Construction 
Zhujiang Power Station - Phase I Operational 
Wuhan Bridge Development Operational 
Wuhan Airport Expressway Operational 
Sea-Land Orient Terminals Limited Operational 
Asia Terminals Limited Operational 
Tate's Cairn Tunnel Company Limited Operational 
Zhujiang Power Station-Phase n Under Construction 
Wuhan Tianhe Airport Operational 
Qingyuan Power Plant (Qingyuan, Guangdong) Operational 
Dalian Xiang Hai Thermal Power Plant (Pali紐） Operational 
From this analysis of New World's China businesses, we can understand why it 
does not persist in obtaining for its infrastructure business, the most attractive 
financing structures profitwise. More inoqportant is for the company to keep up good 
relationships and receive exclusive knowledge and opportunities for it to promote its 
core property development business. The Group's mentality is that the sacrificing of 
certain aspects of the parts are necessary for the good of the whole. This mentality is 
well documented in the following statement of how the conqjany views its China 
business: 
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Overall, the Group so far has achieved a healthy portfolio of infrastructure and 
property investments in China with most of them being committed on 
favourable terms. 
Therefore, the Group's aim is simply to limit its losses, protect its principle 
equity investments, and receive acceptable profits on its long-term, relationship-
building and opportunity procuring businesses to allow it to reap tremendous profits in 
£ 
its lucrative core business, in order to fulfill its long-term, expansionist strategy in 
China: 
The major thrust of the Group's expansion is now in China. The Group has 
accumulated a total attributable land holding of over 25 million square feet in the key 
cities of China and is actively pursuing a number of infrastructure projects in Southern 
and Central China. These projects, together with the existing businesses in Hong Kong 
20 
and overseas, should provide a basis for long-term growth for the Group. 
19 New World Development Company Limited Interim Report 1994/95, pp. 13. 
20 New World Development Con^any Limited Interim Report 1992/93, pp. 10. 
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A Very Unique Set Of Arrangements At The Project Level 
Because of the reasons described in the above section, what we discover is that 
New World Development's project arrangements is a study of eliminating downside 
risk. The project financing strategy causes the corrq)any to adopt a set of peculiar 
arrangements which concentrates on protecting its principle equity investment to the 
extent where to obtain any more protection, the conq>any,s upside profit potentials 
would be capped. Therefore, the overall structure can be described as bearing both 
limited downside potential and limited upside potential, in essence, the payoff structure 
one receives in the situation of a simultaneous purchase of a put and call option (a 
6CBull Spread"), as illustrated below: 
Figure 10. The Bull Spread Option 
Payoff 
H I 
We will now look at some of the main features that create this unique payoff 
structure. 
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Extension of Joint Venture Terms 
In the Gkiangzhou City Northern Ring Road project, the ShenzJien-Huidiou 
E?qpressway (Huizbou Section) project, the Guangzhou-Zhuhai East-line E?qpressway 
project, and the Wuhan Airport Expressway project, the venture term can be extended 
subject to the relevant PRC approvals based on one or a number of the following 
reasons, depending on the individual project: 
i currency exchange losses suffered in respect of principal repayments and 
interest payments on the Group's capital contribution and shareholders' 
I 
loan and on any external loans 
ii. economic loss due to force majeure 
. 
iii. construction cost overruns 
iv. devaluation of the Renminbi 
v. delays in the repayment schedule on the partners' total contributions 
vi. the Group's average annual after tax return over the life of the contract 
period is below the agreed upon percentage 
I 
Details regarding the four projects mentioned above are found in Appendix 5. 
PRC Joint Venture Partner Directly Bears the Losses Suffered by the Group 
In the case of the Guangzhou City Northern Ring Road project, half of any 
cuirency exchange losses suffered by the Group in respect of principal repayments and 
interest payments of the Group's capital contribution and shareholders' loans and the 
Ring Road Syndicated Loan will be corr^ensated for out of GFC's share of profits in 
the joint venture. 
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Renegotiation of Revenue Terms To Ensure Repayment Schedule 
In the Wuhan Airport Expressway project, i£, after the end of the seventh year 
of the joint venture, New World determines that its equity contributions and 
shareholders' loans would not be fiilly repaid by the end of the tenth year of operation 
of the expressway, WACD, its joint venture partner would have to，using its 
negotiations clout, find ways to increase revenues after operating e邓enses to allow for 
repayment of New World's investments within the ten-year period. 
Priority and Guaranteed Repayment Schedule on New World's Principal and 
Interest Payments 
In the case of the Guangzhou-Zhuhai East-line Expressway, priority is given to 
the repayment of New World Guangdong's shareholders' loans within twelve years of 
the opening date of the toll expressway. In the Wuhan Airport Expressway project, full 
repayment of New World's contributions are guaranteed within a period of ten years; 
if WACD, the PRC joint venture partner cannot find ways to increase revenues after 
operating expenses to allow for the repayment of New World's investments within the 
required ten-year period, it would have to pay the Group the difference. 
In many of New World's projects such as Roadway No. 324 (Gayao Section) 
in Zhaoqing, Roadway No. 321 (Fengkai Section) in Zhaoqing, Roadway No. 1964 
(Zhaojiang Section) in Zhaoqing, Roadway No. 321 (Deqing Section) in Zhaoqing, 
Roadway No. 1960 (Guangning Section) in Zhaoqing, the cooperation period of the 
joint venture where the project is generating revenue is clearly divided into "variable 
but deadline constrained guaranteed repayment periods", "fixed and non-guaranteed 
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repayment periods" and '"profit-sharing periods". Generally, the arrangement works as 
follows: 
Repayment Period I (Variable): Repayment of New World's Contributions 
From the date of commencement of toll operations to when New World 
receives total repayment with accrued interest on its total contributions or within five 
years of operations, whichever is earlier, any remaining revenues after operating 
expenses, taxes and statutory contributions will be allocated at a predetermined higher 
percentage to the Group and a predetermined lower percentage to the PRC partners) 
_ I 
for the purpose of making quarterly principal and interest payments on the joint 
venture partners' total contribution. At the end of this maximum period of five years, 
if New World's contributions are not fully repaid, the PRC joint venture partners 
would have to raise funds to repay New World the outstanding principal and interest. 
These additionally raised funds would be treated as shareholders' loans to the joint 
venture. 
Repayment Period II (Fixed): Repayment of the PRC JV Partners' 
Contributions 
After which, for a fixed period of three years, any revenues available for 
distribution will either, depending on the project arrangements, either : 
a) first be used to repay the outstanding contributions of the PRC joint venture 
partners, and then allocated between New World and the PRC joint venture 
partners at the predetermined profit-sharing allocations, or else, 
b) be allocated at a predetermined higher percentage to the iPRC joint venture 
partners and a predetermined lower percentage to the Group for the entire 
three-year period. 
At the end of the fixed three-year period, should there be any balance 
outstanding on the PRC partners' contributions and accrued interest, this amount will 
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either, depending on the project arrangements, be written off at the end of the period 
or else, will cease accruing interest, cease to be payable by the joint venture, and will 
be treated as a capital reserve on liquidation of the joint venture. 
Profit-sharing Period (The Remainder of the Joint Venture Period) 
For the remaining period of the joint venture, any revenues available for 
distribution will be allocated between New World and the project JV partners at the 
predetermined profit-sharing allocations. 
The result of these arrangements for New World would be certain repayment 
of the Group's equity investments together with accrued interest at a certain time, but 
with no hope of windfall gains (or losses) in the periods before the profit-sharing 
periods. As for the PRC joint venture partners, although there is the risk that they may 
not be able to recoup their equity investments within the set time frame, and thus, may 
have to write-off losses, there is the potential to make large windfall gains during the 
repayment periods, should the project produce greater revenues than expected. 
I 
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Below is a chart illustrating the details on the projects which follow the above 
blue-print of arrangements: 
Figure 11. Summary of NWIL's Projects 
~ Wew j? World m C Profit ^ b M m g End of ERC 
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R o a d w a y N o . Feb. 1994 up to first, repay PRC Up to 2015; Write-Off 
324 (Gaoyao maximum Jan. partners' Group: 40% 
Section) in 31，1999; contributions, Partners: 60% 
Zhaoqing Group: 52% remaining time: 
Partners: 48% Group: 40% | 
Partners: 60% 
R o a d w a y N o . March 1995 up Group: 17.5% Up to 2019; Write-Off 
321 (Fengkai to maximum Partners: 82.5% Group: 45% 
Section) in Dec. 31； 1999; Partners: 55% 
Zhaoqing Group: 82.5% j 
Partners: 17.5% 
R o a d w a y N o . December 1995 Group: 17.5%~~ Up to 2019; Write-Off 
1964 (Zhaojiang up to maximum Partners: 82.5% Group: 70% 
Section) in Dec. 30,2000; Partners: 30% 
Zhaoqing Group: 82.5% 
Partners: 17.5% 
R o a d w a y N o . December 1995 Group: 15% Up to 2020; Capital Reserve 
321 (Deqing up to maximum Partners: 85% Group: 45% 
Section) in Dec. 31,2000; Partners: 55% 
Zhaoqing Group: 85% 
Partners: 15% 
R o a d w a y N o . M y 1996 up to Group: 15% Up to 2020; Capital Reserve 
I960 maximum June Partners: 85% Group: 55% 
(Guangning 30,2001; Partners: 45% 
Section) in Group: 85% 
Zhaoqing Partners: 15% 
Limited or No Responsibilities For Cost Overruns or Delays 
In the Roadway No. 1964 (Zhaojiang Section) project in Zhaoqing, New 
World places a cap on the amount above estimated total investment cost it is willing to 
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accept. The Group will only provide funds for cost overruns up to 5% above the 
estimated total investment cost, in the proportion of 20% of such costs. 
As for Roadway No. 321 (Deqing Section) in Zhaoqing and Roadway No. 
I960 (Guangning Section) in Zhaoqing, New World places a disclaimer on any 
additional capital required so that any additions would have to be provided solely by 
the PRC joint venture partners. Moreover, these additional funds required would not 
be treated as a capital contribution, and thus, would not affect the profit distribution | 
percentage. 
J 
Guaranteed “Minimum Revenues" 
In the above description of the fixed repayment schedules, we could already see 
that New World would certainly be able to receive &11 repayment of its equity 
investments together with accrued interest at a fixed time, but the arrangements would 
leave the con^pany with no hope for windfall gains (or losses) in the periods before the 
n 
• I 
profit-sharing periods. In its power generation project, Zhujiang Power Station -
I 
Phase I, this limits on losses and sacrifice of upward gains is also a very large feature. 
In this project, the PRC partner, GDGC is the operator, and the offtake 
agreement guarantees a minimum sales of 3 billion Kwh of electricity annually. GDGC 
guarantees a distributable profit to the joint venture in this amount with an increment 
ofRmb0.025 to RmbO. 10 during the first 10 years. Furthermore, it has undertaken to 
ensure that the joint venture will have sufficient revenues to pay loan principal and 
interest payable by the joint venture (including the external loans and shareholders' 
loans but excluding working capital facilities). In the case that the annual revenue of 
the joint venture is not sufficient to meet the guaranteed profit for distribution, GDGC 
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will pay any shortfall out of its own funds. However, to obtain these assurances, New 
World has to forego any upside gains in revenue: any extra profit (stemming from 
either sales above the 3 billion Kwh per year or increases in the tariff above the 
guaranteed profits belongs to GDGC. 
Market Interpretations Of New World's Infrastructure Venture: an 
infrastructure power play which, while seemingly to provide suboptimal 
prospects, actually present a archetype of how to successfully structure | 
infrastructure projects and do business in China 
We can analyze New World's infrastructure venture by examining the stock 
price movements of the parent con^any, New World Development Con^any Ltd. and 
its subsidiary, New World Infrastructure Limited from a few months before the spin-
of f s October 25, 1995 trading debut on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange up to the 
present. What we discover is that the infrastructure spin-off creates gains both for the 
con^any and investors as the value of the shares of both the parent con^any and the 
I 
subsidiary increase substantially. Graphs revealing the price movements of New World 
I 
Development Co.，Ltd. and New World Infrastructure Ltd. are found in Appendix 6. 
From a low of $15.05 in late January 1995, shares of New World Development 
surge up to $32.80 a week before its subsidiary's debut and continues to climb upward 
at a still fast, but slightly reduced pace, reaching up to $37.40 in the week of Jan. 22-
26, 1996. The reason for this increase lies on the strategic use of the infrastructure 
subsidiary. It is able to help the parent progress towards its long-term China 
expansionist goals. 
As for New World Infrastructure Ltd., the price climb occurs much later, but 
manages to create spectacular gains for its shareholders. The shares debut at 
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HKS12.75, a considerable discount of 6% below the con^any's net tangible asset 
value per share of $13.50, and as a result, is oversubscribed. However, its trading 
debut is rather lackluster; although it occupied the top slot on the HKSE's most active 
list on the day of its trading debut, October 25, 1995，the share price only increased a 
minuscule 1.6% to HKS12.95, with a intraday high of $13.00 amid heavy volume trade 
valued HK$248.5 million. Despite strong support from Credit Lyonnais Securities 
(Asia) Ltd., the share price dipped as low as HK$12.85, almost reaching the offer price 
ofHK$12.75. By tfie week of November 13-17，1995, the stock hits rock bottom at 
I 
II 
$12.40, some $0.35 below the IPO price. Part of this less enthusiastic initial reaction 
can be explained by the seemingly suboptimal structures New World in^oses on its 
China infrastructure projects which seem to suboptimally use corporate fiinds and limit 
upward potentials. However, when investors begin to appreciate New World's 
cautious structure arrangements especially when con^ared to originally more 
attractive ventures such as Hopewell's CEPA which suffers from the parent conqjany's 
I 
financial distress and opaqueness as well as high priced, and see that less leveraged 
. ‘ I 
ROE's with shorter durations could lead to strangely more positive results in a country ， 
like China, they begin to switch from the more risky developers to New World 
Infrastructure, and the price of the subsidiary goes up. Thus, in the week of November 
27- December 1, 1995, the price begins its upward ascent and hits a high of $17.55 in 
the first quarter of 1996. Through time, New World reveals that its subsidiary is a 
company bound for steady long-term growth and therefore, "provides an opportunity 
to invest in infrastructure projects in high-growth regions in China, under the guidance 
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of a management which has demonstrated its ability to operate profitably in this 
area."21 |: 
Conclusions 
In conclusion, in volatile and foreign environments such as China, it is not 
possible to judge a project's relative success or failure singly by regarding ratios of 
project debt vs. project equity financing; likewise, it is not possible to reach any 
sensible conclusions by a single calculation of ROE. This is because in such 
environments, a number of other factors come into play to conq)licate such 
assessments such as political risks and ease and avattability of debt financing. Finally, 
perhaps the most in^ortant factor upon which to assess the relative success/failure of a 
project is the needs, resources and underlying purposes of the investors/sponsors. 
Only when all these factors are taken into account can one make any accurate 
assessment of the success/failure on a given project. 
In the case of New World Development Conq)any Limited, its infrastructure 
projects are financed almost purely by equity investments (consisting of equity 
contributions and shareholders' loans), with very little debt en^loyed. Moreover, the 
company puts a cap on its upward profit potentials. On first glance, such a financing 
structure would seem to indicate a lower ROE, and thus a suboptimal use of funds, 
causing us to reach the premature conclusion that New World's is a suboptimal project 
21 iCNew World Lifrastructure Fairly Valued", J.P. Morgan, Dow Jones International 
News，Dec. 13, 1995. Sec. 2, pp. 1. 
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financing structure. However, once we begin to unearth the underlying reasons for the 
conq>any's peculiar partiality to project equity financing and discover the carefully 
crafted arrangements at the project level, we reach a totally new and opposite 
conclusion. 
New World's Project Financing Arrangements: A Final Assessment 
New World's is a case of phenomenal success in project financing and doing 
business in China. In carrying out its e^ansionist plans into China, that is，opening the 
way for prosperity in its core business of commercial and residential property 
development, it chooses a set of project arrangements and financing structure effective 
both to achieving its long-term strategy in China and matching the constraints and 
needs of the PRC environment. 
Firstly, in adopting a seemingly suboptimal structure and arrangement at the 
project level, New World is able to turn the features of the PRC envkonment to its 
advantage to allow it to achieve its long-term property development strategy. 
Basically, it does so by making use of the Chinese proverb mentality of deceive a 
drop of water, Dig a river in return". By rushing to provide its PRC partners and thus 
the local governments with the "first drops of water", through the undertaking of 
projects crucial to its partners' political agenda (but perhaps less attractive) and 
providing them with favourable terms in the project financing arrangements, New 
World obligates and delights its partners and the local governments into committing 
themselves to the projects and fiirnishing it with the most desirable sites (at much 
discounted prices) for future commercial and residential property development. 
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Secondly, New World's project financing structure and arrangements are well 
adapted to the constraints and requirements of the PRC environment. The con^any 
destroys our traditional notion of a high degree of equity financing as suboptimal by 
bringing in the new variable, investment duration, into our traditional two factor (ROE 
and financial leverage) project assessment equation. New World reveals to us that in 
the case of doing business in China, project success is based on receiving an acceptable 
rate of return on investment and getting the principal investment back as soon as 
possible, that is, achieving a shortened duration，even at the expense of sacrificing all 
upward profit potentials. Furthermore, during this period of investment and during a 
project's operational period, all attempts need to be made to protect the initial 
principal investment and to insulate the project from con^letion risks, credit risks, 
political risks, etc., through the careful drafting of contracts with contingency plans, in 
order to eliminate or minimize losses. What we discover is that the traditional call 
option payoff structure envisioned in projects in the west is perhaps rarely feasible in a 
country like China, and therefore, a project will receive a greater probability success 
when conceived as an arrangement which limits both losses and upside potentials, 
giving us in essence, a 'IjuII spread" or a simultaneous call and put option payoff 
structure. 
Concluding Words 
Through the New World case, we see that structures attractive in the west may 
be unattainable in Asia, while structures unattractive to projects in the west can prove 
to be highly successfiil in Asia. Asia fiinctions under a different set of rules and 
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assimq>tions. Therefore, in order to achieve success in project financing in Asia, it is 




HUANENG POWER INTERNATIONAL INC. 
Introduction 
Thesis 
Project Finance in its primitive form is structured financing for a capital 
intensive project in which the assets themselves (physical and legal) serve as the 
collateral for leading. Risks for the financing are allocated amongst the different 
parties involved in the project through the use of non-recourse or limited recourse 
debt. These parties include the project sponsors, the government, the construction 
companies, equipment suppliers, banks, users of the products of the projects, and so 
forth. 
Over the years, changes in the global capital market place have transformed the 
outlook of Project Finance. Innovative structures are put in place by skillful 
practitioners. These innovations include open-ended and close-ended structures and 
pooled projects, to name but a few. Yet, the ultimate goal of such innovations is still 
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the same: to reduce the risks of the projects while providing maximum returns to the 
different capital providers of the project(s). 
In the case of HPI，through the innovative design of a hybrid structure ofRMB 
denominated debt and equity financing, the conq)aiiy is able to create a highly 
sophisticated structure, a structure which can truly be said to be superior to others of 
its kind. This structure, using an open-ended project finance structure in contrast to 
the traditional close-ended model and tied to a new tariff-setting mechanism, actually 
destroys the traditional relationship between debt financing and equity financing. As a 
B 
result, debt financing, rather than impair further equity financing as the debt-to-equity 
ratio swells, actually provides a positive reinforcement. The result is an interactive 
financing structure which allows HPI to actually reduce the risks involved in the 
projects while providing better than average returns for its different capital providers. 
However, what the participants failed to acknowledge was that the project was 
a project in Asia. With the lack of a clear legal and regulatory framework to enforce 
contracts, the Chinese government's unwillingness to observe the pricing policy 
arrangements, resulted in the loss of all competitive advantage in the project structure 
in practice and a loss of confidence in investors' hopes. 
Company Background 
The con^any was established on June 30, 1994，to develop, construct, own 
and operate large coal-fired power plants throughout China using modem proven 
technology supplied by leading international equipment suppliers. 
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The corcqpany currently wholly owns and operates five power plants, the 
"operating power plants", with an aggregate installed capacity of 2,900 MW, which 
are located in five of China's prosperous provinces (Liaoning, Fujian, Hebei, Jiangsu 
and Guangdong). In addition, the con^any is actively developing five of its planned 
power plants" with a planned installed capacity of 3,900 MW, and will acquire from 
HIPDC before December 31，1994, three other planned power plants currently under 
development or construction with a planned installed capacity of 2,000 MW. In 
addition, the con^pany has preliminary plans to add 6,100 MW of installed capacity 
through a number of projected power plants" located adjacent to certain of the 
operating power plants and planned power plants. The planned and projected power 
plants are located in the same five provinces as the operating power plants. 
HIPDC 
Huaneng Intemational Power Development Corp.(HEPDC) was established in 
1985 as a Sino-foreign joint venture. As a pioneer in raising foreign and domestic 
capital in order to inqjort power generating equipment, HIPDC has developed power 
plants and transmission facilities jointly with local governments on a nationwide basis. 
The Formation of HPI 
HIPDC has been operating and developing a number of power plant projects 
nationwide. In 1993, the company estimated that its capital requirement would total to 
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RMB 35,551 millions from 1994 to 199922 for all the projects that the conqjany holds 
in the five coastal provinces. 
It is e j e c t e d that both debt and equity will have to be used to finance the 
planned power plants and projected power plants. The use of debt financing, however, 
might result in higher leverage for HPIDC. Since each of the existing five operating 
plants wholly owned by the corporation has already incurred a significant amount of 
borrowing to finance its own construction, operation as well as future e邓ansions，the 
high gearing ratio-base made it very difficult for the corporation to obtain more debt 
I i 
financing. Moreover, such a ratio-base also meant that whatever debt financing it 
obtained would have to proceed at a very high interest cost. Thus, for the purpose of 
fund raising, the corporation formed a new subsidiary, HPI, on June 30, 1994. 
The Reorganization of HPI 
As part of the fund raising effort by HIPDC, HPI has undergone a 
reorganization shortly after its formation. Under the reorganization process, the five 
operating power plants were grouped under a single entity under the ownership of 
HPI. An initial public offering of HPI's shares also made a part of the fund raising 
effort. 
Under the Sino-foreign joint venture, HIPDC was not allowed to be listed in 
the China market, which limited its source of financing. By establidiing a new private 
conqjany and listing it, HIPDC could raise additional firnds for the future development 
of power plants. 
22 Appendix 8 
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On the other hand, the retirement of some government loans during the 
reorganization helped to reduce the debt-equity ratio. A lower ratio would enhance 
HIPDC's fixture debt financing charges. 
Asset Transfer 
As part of the process, HIPDC's ownership in the five operating plants and the 
planned plants would be purchased by HPI. Five planned power plants and projected 
“ I 
腰 
power plants would also be transferred to HPI23. Moreover, HPI planned to acquire 
three other planned power plants under construction or development from HIPDC 
before December 31，1994. 
Subject to PRC laws and regulations, the purchase of the power plants require 
an appraisal of the current replacement cost of all the fixed assets. This reconciliation 
led to an increase ofRMB 4.11 billion in value of net property from RMB 5.74 billion 
to RMB 9.85 billion, which would be helpful for the fixture rate setting. Consequently, 
the values of the plants represented HIPDC's capital contribution to HPI in exchange 
for a share of owners' equity to HPI. 
Debt Transfer 
As the operating and planned power plants were financed by debt，in acquiring 
these assets, the loans related to them were also transferred to HPI. A portion of local 
governments loans (Rmb435 millions) were retired in return for equity ownership of 
22 Appendix 8 
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the company (34.77%) for the respective local governments. This eventually reduced 
the debt ratio from the initial level of 10.09 (6,904,677 / 684,409) to 1.24 (6,470,052 / 
5,234,893) after reorganization, which favored the eon^pany for future debt raising. 
The remained outstanding loans from local governments together with the long-term 
bank loans and central government loans on-lent by HIPDC to the company were 
reclassified as shareholders' loans24. 
Debt financing included loans from multilateral and bilateral institutions, export 
credit agencies and commercial lenders, as well as the issuance of debt securities. 
Although there had been little use of limited-recourse and non-recourse project debt 
financing, HPDIC believed that the increased equity capital from the initial public 
offering and its inqjroved earnings potential reflecting application of the pricing policy 
would increase its financing alternatives. 
Combined Offering (IPO) 
In the IPO, about RMB 5,129 million was raised. After deducting the power . 
plant's set up cost25 in 1994: RMB 1,949 million, the rest was deposited into a foreign 
currency account at a bank in China that is permitted to engage in foreign exchange 
24 Appendix 8 
25 This refers to the initial construction cost including interest during construction for 
the Dandong Plant, Shangan Phase II Expansion and Shantou Coal-fired Plant as 
shown in Appendix 8 
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transactions. HPI would be entitled to use such deposits to pay for goods and services 
and to repay foreign currency-denominated debt. 
Figure 12. Listing Information of HPI 
Corporation Date: toe 30，1994 
Listing Date: October 13, 1994 
Nmttber of S l t ^ m Q f t o ^ U 
American Depository Receipts (ADR) 31,250,000 
Equivalent to Class N Ordinary Shares 1,250,000,000 
Offering Price (per ADS) US$ 20.00 
Proceeds to the Con^any US$605，625,000.00 
Underwriting Discounts and Commissions US$ 19,375,000.00 
T o t a l US$625,000,000.00 
Post-Offering Ownership 
After the reorganization, HIPDC, the principal shareholder owned 40.23% of 
I 
the Company's shares, 7 local government investment corporations occupied 34.77%, 
while public investors held the remaining 25% shares. 
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Figure 13. The Post-Offering Ownership of HPI 
Local Gov't 
Investment Corp. 
35% ^ ^ ^ ^ 
\ : : � HIPDC 
Public 丨 nvestors 輒 
25% 
Figure 14 The ownership status of each company 
Class A Ordinary Shares 丨 
HIPDC 2,011,500 40.23 
Hebei Provincial Construction Investment Co. 452,250 9.04 j 
Fujian Investment & Development General Co. Ltd. 407,250 8.15 j 
Jiangsu Province Investment Co. 312,375 6.25 
Liaoning Energy Corporation 226,125 4.52 
Dalian Municipal Construction Investment Co. 226，125 4.52 
Nantong Municipal Construction & Investment Co. 67,875 1.36 
Shantou Electric Power Development Co. 46,500 0.93 
Subtotal 3,750,000 75.00 
Class N Ordinary Shares 
Public shareholders 1,250,000 25.00 
Subtotal 1,250,000 25.00 
T o t a l 5,000,000 100.00 
The reorganization and the combined offering of HPI created one of the largest 
independent power producers in the world. 
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Major Events 
In order to understand more clearly the details of the reorganization and public 
offering, the main events are summarized below:-
Oct. 1994 Reorganization with 25% of the equity o w n e r s h i p offered for public 
subscription 
- A Combined Offering ofRMB 5，129 million 
- U s e of funds: To settle borrowings of RMB 972 million and 
distributions to HIPDC prior to the Reorganization of RMB 433 
million. 
-Projected annual rate of return 
11% on equity financed Net fixed Assets 
7% on debt-financed Net Fixed Assets 
-Other share holders: HEPDC and seven local governments 
Oct. 1994 Nantong Power Plant Phase H E^ansion Project receives State 
Planning Commission approval 
Dec. 1994 Fuzhou Power Plant Phase H E?qpansion Project receives State Planning 
Commission approval 
Jan. 1995 Joint Venture construction plan with Southern Electric International for 
building a new power plant to be sited in Nanjing City, Jiangsu 
province, China. The ownership stakes are 51.7% and 30% to HPI and 
SEI respectfiilly, with the rest going to the local governments. The 
project involves building two 600 MW units at a total cost of $1.2 
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billion. Financing is to be secured through equity investments 
amounting to 25% of the projected cost and commercial loans. A profit 
agreement with the local government is required before a final contract 
can be signed. It is e j ec t ed that the company's 15% profit scheme 
approved by the Ministry of Power Industry will be accepted by 
Provincial authorities. 
Feb. 1995 Acquisitions of Phase I and H of the Shantou coal-fired power plant 
will con^lete as soon as practicable. Provincial Power Bureau and City 
Government confirmed their support for the acquisition 
Feb. 1995 Acquisitions of Phases I and II of the Dandong Power Plant 
Mar. 1995 Report on operation in the first months 
Mar. 1995 The construction of Shangan Phase H Expansion project is due for 
conq)letion 
Jul. 1995 The company announces the signing of a purchase agreement with a 
group made of US conq>anies Westinghouse Corp. and Sargent & 
Lirndy and U. K equipment maker Babcock Energy to provide four 
sets of 350-megawatt power generating units for two power plant 
facilities, in Dalian and Dandong. Financing consists of 85% Qxport 
credits from the U. S. and U. K governments that carry an annual 
interest rate of 5.95%, with the remaining 15% consisting of 
international commercial loans. 
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Analysis 
HPI's primary business is power generation. To ensure the con^any's income, 
a profitable tariff regulation must be set, which usually involves a vigorous negotiation 
with the government. What's more, in order to obtain positive fiiture growth in stock 
price and dividends for the investors, the net income of the con^pany's operation must 
increase over time. Yet, as a power plant can only generate a fixed amount of 
electricity, the corcqpany has only two alternatives. The first one is to adjust its tariff 
upward. The second one is to increase its generation capacity. 
Increasing capacity means developing or acquiring new plants. Either way, 
extra funding is needed. HPI would have to either reinvest its profits, issue new 
shares, raise new debt, or do both. Therefore, the structure of the conqjany must be 
attractive to both shareholders and potential lenders. 
The New Tariff Setting Regulatory Policy and Its Advantages 
One of the most inq)ortant achievements of the HPI reorganization effort is the 
development of anew tariff-setting mechanism. 
Old tariff structure 
Prior to the reorganization, all of the five operating plants observed the tariff 
agreed upon between HIPDC and the government in 1986. It was fixed at the return 
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to equity of 4 fen26 per kWh, which proved to be profitable at that time. Although 
such a tariff structure provided good returns on equity in 1986, these returns had 
steadily deteriorated over the years. By 1994, return on equity became little more than 
miserly. 
One major problem with the old-tariff setting structure was its failure to 
address currency risks. Since the inaqplementation of the open-door policy, the RMB 
has been devaluating. Thus, for HPI's listing in NYSE to be successful, the problem 
had to be addressed and resolved before US dollar-dominated investors would be 
willing to commit their investments. 
Another problem with the old structure was its failure to recognize the 
increased demand for electricity. As a result of the shortage of supply and inflating 
demand, actual electricity prices in mainland China has gone up. However, the old 
structure failed to acknowledge the growth in demand and failed to capture the 
opportunity for earnings growth. 
New tariff structure 
To resolve the currency risk problem, the initial preference of HPI was to 
adjust current profit margins to make them acceptable and to link them to the USD to 
adjust automatically for any future RMB devaluation. However, the policy was 
rejected by the Ministry of Electric Power stating that any linkage of equity returns to 
foreign currency was unacceptable. The solution was a proposed new tariff-setting 
regulatory policy. 
2 6 1 fen = one Chinese cent 
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• An after-tax return on average net fixed assets of 15%. 
The rate setting policy agreed to between the government and the corr^any 
makes use of the regulations that commit purchasers of electricity to pay power 
rates that permit the seller to recover all operating expenses and debt service costs 
and to earn a profit. 
Under the Pricing Policy, the Corrq)any was promulgated to earn a blended 
after-tax rate of return conq)rised of 15% per year on equity-financed Net Fixed 
i 
Assets at the planned output and a minimum of 7% per year on debt-financed Net 
Fixed Assets. The rate of return on debt-financed Net Fixed Assets was subject to 
an adjustment which deducted the weighted average interest rate on the 
Conqjany's debt from the 15% rate of return, up to a maximiim deduction of 8% 
(interest expenses in excess of 8% would be recoverable separately as operating 
costs), thereby yielding a minimum 7% rate of return on debt-financed Net Fixed 
Assets. As a consequence, the lower the interest rate, the higher would be the 
overall return to equity investors. 
HPI expected that the power rates applicable to electricity sales in 1995 would 
be approved by the relevant Price Administration Bureau in the fourth quarter of 
1994 and planned to phase in the allowed rate of return within four years. 
Tariff rate tied into the Net Fixed Assets 
The most in^ortant feature of the tariff setting policy is its direct tie into the 
net fixed assets. As net fixed assets can be financed by owners' equity as well as by 
debt, increasing the use of leverage would provide higher returns to equity. Here 
shows an exan^)le. 
t 
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Figure 15. Effect of New Tariff Structure on ROE 
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The above mechanism works as follows: 
=> Suppose NFA = 100 RMB and the debt and equity ratio is 7 to 3. According to 
the new tariff setting, the equity rate of return is 15% and a return of 4.5 RMB is 
realized. The 15% rate of return applies to the capital financed by debt. However, 
the interest rate is set at a maximum of 8%. Thus, the remaining 7% will be 
distributed to equity holders which amounts to RMB 4.9. 
The realized return to the equity holders then becomes the sum of RMB 4.5 plus 
the RMB 4.9 remaining from the return on the debt-financed NFA. The resulting 
ROE is therefore 31%. 
Toa certain extent, the higher the debt, the higher will be the ROE. 
HPI is currently running a debt to equity ratio lower than 7:3. However, it is 
management's intention to have the con^any's debt to equity reach this a level. 
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The Result of the NFA-tied Rate Calculation - Interactive Financing 
The superiority ofHPI's structure lies at its interactive essence. In a corporate 
finance context, an optimal capital structure calls for a balance between debt and 
equity. As debt financing is believed to be cheaper than equity financing, it is tenq)ting 
for a con^any to finance its capital needs through debt. However, higher debt levels 
imply higher risks As a result, lenders will demand higher interest on the borrowings 
meaning that the cost of debt financing will be higher. HPI's structure however, 
breaks down this traditional relationship. 
Through the new tariffs mechanism, the higher the gearing, the higher will be 
the equity returns. This mechanism essentially creates an interaction between equity 
and debt. 
Figure 16. Interaction between equity and debt financing 
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Other features of the pricing policy include the following; 
• Inclusion of construction work in progress ("CWIP") in the rate base. The use of 
CWIP in the rate base would help smooth earnings profits over the next four years. 
• Utilizing an aggregate rate base to calculate returns on equity rather than an 
individual plant rate base. This eliminated the tariff variation among different 
power plants because of their differences in net fixed assets. 
. . . - . . . . . 产 丨.: 
• Lengthening depreciable lives of generation assets from 10 years to 15 years. This 
action would allow for higher earnings over a longer period of time 
• Allowing for "revaluation" of generating assets after 15 years. 
A Capital Structure That Reduces Risk 
HPI was established with the planned plants and projected plants. When it 
raises debt through open-ended pooled project financing, it pooled the operating and 
planned plants together to form a portfolio. In this way, it was able to effectively 
reduce the different risks that may otherwise be much higher, 
(a) Engineering and Construction risks 
For the planned and projected plants, the majority of risks is due to engineering 
failures, procurement problems, cost over-runs and corr^letion delays. Under the by-
laws of the con^p any, management is authorized to use its retained earnings from the 
operating plants to fund the capital expenditures of projects under development or 
projects being planned. That means the engineering and construction risks for the new 
projects will be shared by the operating plants. 
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(b) Default risk 
The cash inflows from the operating plants would reduce the default risks 
associated with the project _ not all cash inflows are remote in the fiiture like a 10-year 
zero coupon bond. Such a diversification has the advantage of a portfolio effect. If one 
of the plants fails to be con^pleted and operated in time, other plants' inflows can set it 
off to pay for interest and loan payments. This is known as cross-collateralization of 
cash flow. 
(c) Operation risk 
Operation risk for power plant projects is attributed to material supply risks, 
transportation risks, off-take agreements, tariff setting regulations, electricity demand 
and competition. Provisions in the con^any's by-laws also allow the transfer of cash 
from profitable plants to plants that are running deficits. Such a provision significantly 
reduces the default risk for debts obtained to finance the initial operations. 
This risk minimization is con^leted by the allocation of risks through the 
following mechanisms: the off-take agreement, i.e.，new tariff setting, the construction 
contract and the operation contract, 
(d) Expropriation Risk 
On the other hand, since more than 30% of HPI's shares are owned by the various 
municipalities where the plants are located and will be built, expropriate risk is 
significantly reduced. 
We have now discussed all the main characteristics which illustrate the well-
thought out sophistication and superiority of Huaneng's pooled project financing 
structure. We will now look at how well this structure was able to work in practice. 
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Reviewing the Performance of HPI 
According to the Efficient Market Hypothesis, in a semi-strong efficient 
market, all publicly known information would be reflected in the stock price. To 
indirectly judge the effectiveness of HPI's financing structure and strategy, we will 
now review HPI's share's performance since its IPO in October 1994. The monthly 
stock price is plotted as follows. 
Figure 17. Stock Price of HPI 
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As can be seen from the above graph, HPI's stock price has rollercoastered 
since the company's IPO. 
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HPTs stock price dropped immediately after the IPO, from US$20 to 
US$12,875, a 36% drop. Another Chinese power con^any listed in New York, the 
Shangdong Huaneng e邓 erienced the same magnitude of decline, 21%，with the first 
two months after its listing. Such drops reveal the market's comment that the price is 
too high. Therefore, what has happened? HPI's structure seemed so attractive and 
invincible just minutes ago. We will now look at the factors behind HPI's roller 
coaster stock price performance. 
S 
An Analysis of the Roller Coaster Performance of HPI's Stock Price 
No Dividends Policy 
While Shangdong Huaneng managed to declare a dividend for the year, HPI's 
stated policy declares that the company would not declare a dividend anytime in the 
foreseeable future. That may serve as another trigger for the decline of the share's 
price. 
Lack of Confidence in the Chinese Government 
Another factor that has casted shadows on the conq>any's share performance is 
the plunge of public confidence in the Chinese Government. The disappointing 
performance of HPI's stock price for the first two months reflect a general lack of 
confidence in the Chinese government's willingness to observe the pricing policy. 
When the stock price hit its bottom of $12.875, it leapt up to US$15.5 in 
February 1995. The rebound was a result of the company's success in obtaining 
approval from the government for a rate increase, from 4.15 fen to 33.4 fen per kw/h. 
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With this rate increase, HPI would reach a rate of return of 11 per cent 
(499+97/4534+878 x 100%, shown in Appendix 7) this year, as stated in the listing 
prospectus in September. This favorable news would stimulate its price to soar. 
Environmental Factors 
On March, 1995, the annual report of HPI (Appendix 8) announced and 
recorded a decline on Return On Equity (ROE) from 8.28%27 to 4.10%28 semi-
annually. The lower than expected earnings was due to the heavy rainfall in some parts 
of China. Hydro-power output was boosted up and provincial grids were then able to 
substitute with cheaper power sources29. As a result, the stock price dipped to 
US$14.5. 
Financing Good News 
Between May and July, 1995, the stock price surged to the year's highest 
position of US$19.25. The surge was largely due to the announcement by the 
company that it had been able to obtain financing for the two generating units of 
Dalian and Dandong at lower interest .charges. Investors could thus expect a higher 
rate of equity return. 
27 ROE of Jan 94'- June 94' = RMB 433,376,000/ RMB 5,234,893,000 = 8.28% 
28 ROE of July 94'- Dec. 94' = RMB 443,527,000/ RMB 10,807,083,000 = 4.10% 
29 'Huaneng Power Takes a Hit From Its Own Underwriter', The Wall Street Journal 
Europe, 11/08/95, Sara Webb, Pg. 22 
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Downward Revisions in Earnings Forecasts 
Profit taking pushed the stock down after the share reached its US$19 peak. 
Rumors saying that Lehman Brothers would lower its forecast for HPI's earnings 
pushed the price further downward. These rumors was later confirmed by a Lehman's 
report adjusting the con^any's EPS in 1995 from US$1.45 to US$1.17 and adjusting 
its recommendation to 6CBuy." Nevertheless, the investment bank e邓lained that the 
reduction was effectively a 'one-off short-term adjustment and HPI's long-term 
development plan and earnings-growth potential would not be affected. 
The stock price reacted by plunging back to its low in March. In December, it 
reached US$14.375. The prolonged negotiation with the Chinese government over 
the new tariff setting greatly contributed to the gloomy sentiment. 
Figure 18. Valuation Table of HPI and Other Companies (20 November 1995) 
卿 p t i ^ rtTSS)�lOE F Y 9 f _ 明 5 y t m s growth f%) 
CEPA 13.20 5,4 2JA ， 
HPI — 14.50 — 10.2 — 28,0 
S. Huaneng 6.825 10.0 5,5 
Sector average 8.0 21.2 
(Source: Lehman Brothers) 
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Conclusions 
On the surface, HPI's project finance structure is one which boasts superiority 
in that it can dispel the traditional relationship between project debt and project equity 
financing. The design covers an almost exhaustive list of project-related risks and 
would even be able to grant exceptionally favourable returns to equity even in the case 
ofRMB devaluation. However, ironically, the structure's superiority is also the source 
of its failure. While the tying of the compmy's project finance structure to the new 
tariff setting policy rewarded a high-leverage structure and provided m interactive 
financing mechanism, by relying too highly on the new tariff setting policy in a land 
where the promises of government lack enforcement, HPI's clever project design 
proved to be clever, but not clever enough. 
The nonfulfillment of the new tariff proved to be the "Aquille's heel" in the 
con^any's sophisticated financing structure. According to the interactive financing 
model (see Figure 19 below), if the new tariff setting cannot be achieved, additional ’ 
debt financing would only hinder equity financing. As a result no interactive 
mechanism can be achieved and HPI's already high gearing ratio would result in a 
plunge in the stock price to reflect investors' change of heart about the con^any's 
future prospects. 
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Figure 19. Interrupted financing model 
D/E • fcterest rate 
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Concluding Words 
Through the Huaneng Power International case, we can see that structures 
attractive and truly invincible on paper may prove self-defeating in actual practice. 
This is because in Asia, unlike the west, promises made by governments and 
government agencies are scarcely enforceable, and to base a grand structure on such 
things as contracted promises, would be the equivalent of building a fortress on the 
x^iims of a moment. For this reason, in emerging economies such as China, it is 
necessary to step out of the intricate webs within the individual project finance 




SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Project finance in Asia is a riddle within itself. On the one hand, we are told 
that it will be the major force to emancipate the last set of nations from their forced 
isolation of backwardness and thus, they will welcome the adventurers onto their 
impoverished sovereign lands，while on the other hand, all the conditions project 
investors face seem to indicate that nothing could be further than the truth. 
When investors try to bring with them their preconceived notions of how . 
project finance is done in the west，they are headed for disaster. This is because true 
project financing does not exist in Asia. Because the credit ratings of the various 
entities implicit in the project financing equation (e.g.，the offiaker, the fuel supplier, 
the operator, etc.) in many of the emerging market economies lie ambiguous and open 
to interpretation, the singular concept of allocating project risks to the various parties 
involved take the nature of playing a game of roulette. Without a proper allocation of 
risk to ensure the ultimate feasibility of the project, no lender would be willing to lend 
funds solely on the basis of a project's future cash flows. For this reason, in Asia, 
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project finance in its purest sense，that is pure non-recourse debt financing, does not 
exist, and in fact，even limited recourse debt financing gives a cause for celebration. 
As a result, in Asia, even though debt financing is still provided on the basis and 
feasibility of a project's future cash flows, a number of support mechanisms such as 
sovereign guarantees and counter-guarantees providing windows to international 
commercial debt fiiding need to accompany these former assurances. 
However, these '^windows to funds" are becoming narrower and narrower due 
to developing countries' aversiveness to sovereign debt. As a result, investors are 
beginning to have to consider other structures, structures which in the west would 
seem to be severely unattractive and limiting. Amongst these new structures are 
structures which envision full recourse debt financing with the provision of direct 
corporate guarantees and structures where the greater portion of financing consists of 
equity provided directly by the developers themselves. 
On the other hand, other infrastructure investors are trying their hands at 
creating increasingly sophisticated structures to deal with the greater and more 
conq)licated sets of risks inherent in Asia such as currency risks and foreign exchange , 
convertibility. The result is a set of superior structures which seem invincible and 
attractive on paper. 
However, despite these two divergent paths, the conclusions gained from their 
consequences are the same. In Asia, there is no one optimal project financing 
structure, but there is one guiding principle. The princqjle is singly that the optimal 
project financing structure for a project is the one which comes up with a perfect 
match of investors'/sponsors' needs, resources, and purposes with the demands of the 
operating environmettt. Therefore, in the case of New World Development which took 
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the first path choosing a project structure which seemed strangely suboptimal by the 
fact that it was conqjosed primarily of equity with both limited losses and profit 
potentials, we find that the structure is "optimal" since it was fitting to the con^any's 
purposes, and just as in^ortantly, fitting to the conq>lex demands of the China 
operating environment. And therefore, in the other case, that of Huaneng Power 
International which took the latter path, we find, even though the structure is superior 
or "optimal" in the absolute sense, when immersed into the complexities of an 
V 
unenforceable regulatory framework, the structure proves self-defeating since it did 
not take into account the undependable promises of a fickle government. In summary, 
success in project financing in Asia is not dependent on the sophistication of the 
individual project structures, and in the same reasoning, nor is failure the result of an 
individually suboptimal structure. To succeed, financiers must adapt project structures 
to the demands of Asia while keeping an overall consistency with the developer's 
overall infrastructure development strategy. 
'• ‘ I 
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Appendix 1 List of NWIL Projects 
Market Valuation 
EXISTING PROJECTS $ million) 
PRC 
Guangdong Province 
Guangzhou City Northern Ring Road 1^,220 
SheiLdien-Hui^iou Expressway (Huizhou Section) 232 
Guangzhou-Zhuhai East-line Expressway 7 9 
Roadway No. 324 (Gaoyao Section) in Zhaoqing 148 
Roadway No. 321 (Fengkai Section) in Zhaoqing 208 
Roadway No. 1964 (Zhaojiang Section) in Zhaoqing 313 
Roadway No. 321 (Deqing Section) in Zhaoqing 251 
Roadway No. 1960 (Guangning Section) in Zhaoqing 135 
Zhujiang Power Station - Phase I 783 
Wuhan 
Wuhan Bridge Development 5 
Wuhan Airport E^qpressway 434 
Hong Kong 
Sea-Land Orient Terminals Limited I , 2 0 3 
Asia Terminals Limited 1,530 
Tate's Cairn Tunnel Con^any Limited 242 
PROVISIONAL PROJECTS 










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Appendix 3 NWIL Projects Financing 
： ： 丨 丨 ^ 蛘 N e w 
I l i i i l B ^ a M 彻 i ： . • • o^cr : ： w»m9s 
； ^ M I I B H S l i i i ^ ^ l l l :..:.: - i f ^ m :. Wi ：• - ； fruM 
1 ¾ ¾ • ； _ 麵 滅 粆 . 麵 ^ m g 
I where ‘ I^oans) W«i4d 
1 ¾ ^ ^ ^ ¾ ¾ ¾ 111^1111111¾ 11111111¾ S ^ i l i i l ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ 
Guangzhou~ RMB1,502 54.597% 45.403% 26.461% N/A 40% 
I City Northern million 
Ring Road, RMB1,217.5 67.355% 32.645% 32.645% N/A 40% 
I Guangdong million 
Shen^ien- RMB 374 N/A N/A N/A Revenues 34.05% 
Huizhou million f r o m 
Expressway Operations 
(Huizhou of Huizhou 
I Section), 
Guangzhou 
Guangzhou-~~RMB4,3600.000% 100.000% 20.000% N/A 20% 




Roadway No. RMB 159" 0.000% 100.000% 52.013% N/A 40% 
I 324 (Gaoyao million 
Section) in …， 
Zhaoqing, RMB139 0.000% 100.000% 59.496% N/A 40% 
I Guangdong million 
Roadway No. RMB 283" 0.000% 100.000% 60.000% N/A 45% 
321 (Fengkai million 
Section) in , • … ， 
Zhaoqing RMB 278 0.000% 100.000% 61.08% N/A 45% 
Guangdong million 
Roadway No. RMB 204" 0.000% 100.000% 74.5098% N/A 70% 
1964 million 
I (Zhaojiang , • ， … 
Section) in RMB 197 0.000% 100.000% 77.157% N/A 70% 
Zhaoqing, million 
Guangdong ; —— 
Roadway No. RMB 0.000% 100.000% 55.000% N/A 45% 
321 (Deqing 524,067,000 
S S i g , m RMB 0.000% 100.000% 59.496% N/A 45% 
. 1 GuangdoAg 484,467,000 
Roadway No. RMB 270 0.000% 100.000% 60.000% N/A 55% 
1960 million 
I (Guangning … ， 
S e c t i 0n) in RMB 228 0.000% 100.000% 71.053% N/A 55% 
I Zhaoqing, million 
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Guangdong 
Wuhan RMB1,792 0.000% 98.575% 48.045%Revenues 48.86% 
Bridge million = 1.425% 
Development, 
Wuhan RMB 885.5 0.000% 97.019% 97.12% Revenues 48.86% 
million =2.981% 




Zhujiang RMB2,700 58.69% 41.309% 12.593% N/A 25% 
Power Station million 
- P h a s e I， 
Guangdong 




H K D $ 3 , 6 5 1 N / A N/A N/A N/A 45.92% 
Terminals million 
Ltd. (ATL) 




Zhujiang RMB3,500 N/A N/A N/A N/A 25% 
Power Station million 
- P h a s e n, 
Guangdong L _ — — I 
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Appendix 4 Details of the Project Financing Arrangements / Plans for the 
Various Projects 
1. Guangzhou City Northern Ring Road: 
Toll Road - Operating Stage 
Cost: RMB 1,502 million 
‘ ^ x t & ^ m l Broject 脑 t Finmneing 5 4 6 0 % ~ 1 ¾ ¾ ¾ ¾ ¾ ¾ ^ 
卿 $ 9 7 mMon) f ‘ � 
a) An international syndicated loan facility 
guaranteed by Hong Kong Island 
Development Ltd., a wholly-owned 
subsidiary of New World Development 
: , 麵 喊 ^ 1 1 ^ : 脚 益 碰 织 ‘ 45A<m RMB681,950^606.^ 
a) Capita Contributions RMB446,449,241.80 
29.72% 
i)NWIL US$19.255 million 
=RMB161,949,241.80 
jj) GFC RMB284,500,000 
b) Shareholders’ Loans RMB235,501,364.40 
i)NWIL US$28 million 
=RMB235,501,364.40 
15.58% -
Total Amount Equity Funded by NWIL RMB397,450,606.20 
26.46% 
2. Shenzhen-Huizhou Expressway (Huizhou Section) (Guangzhou) 
Toll-road - Operating Stage 
Cost: RMB 374 million 
N/A 
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3. Guangzhou-Zhuhai East-line Expressway - Phase I，Guangdong 
Toll Road - Construction Stage 
Cost: RMB 4,360,000,000 
RMB4^6l>iajl!i0ii 細 . 冊 ％ 
a) Shareholders, Loans RMB3,780 million 86.70% 
i) New World through New World RMB 756 million 
Guangdong (20%) 
ii) Guangdong Development RMB 756 million 
Holdings through New World 
Guangdong (20%) 
. iii) Guangdong Provincial Freeway RMB 945 million 
Company (25%) 
iv) Zhuhai City Expressway RMB 756 million 
Company (20%) 
v) Panyu City Bridge Administration RMB 189 million 
Company (5%) 
vi) Zhongshan City Bridge and RMB 189 million 
Highway Construction 
Co. (5%) 
vii) Jiangmen Transport Project RMB 189 million 
Company (5%) 
b) Capital Contributions RMB 580 million 1 3 . 3 0 % _ 
j) New World Through New World RMB 116 million 
Guangdong 20%) 
jj) Guangdong Development RMB 116 million 
(Holdings) Ltd. through ： 
New World Guangdong (20%) 
jjj) Guangdong Provincial Freeway RMB 145 million 
Company (25%) 
iv) Zhuhai City Expressway RMB 116 million 
Company (20%) — 
v ) Panyu City Bridge Admmistration RMB 29 million 
Company (5%) 
vi) Zhongshan City Bridge and RMB 29 million 
—— Highway Construction ！ 
Co. (5%) 
vii) Jiangmen Transport Project RMB 29 million 
Company (5%) 
Total Amount Equity Funded by NWIL RMB 872 million 20.00% 
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4. Roadway No. 324 (Gaoyao Section) 
Toll Road - Operating Stage 
Total Cost: RMB 159 million 
a) Shareholders' Loans RMB 105 milHon 66.04% 
i) NWIL (52%) RMB 54.6 mimon 
ii) Zhaoqing Highway Development RMB 34.65 million 
Ltd. (33%) 
iii) Gaoyao Highway Development RMB 15.75 million 
Company (15%) 
b) Capital Contributions RMB 54 million 33.96% 
j) NWIL (52%) RMB 28.08 million 
ii) Zhaoqing Highway Development RMB 17.82million 
Ltd. (33%) 
iii) Gaoyao Highway Development RMB 8.10 million 
Company (15%) 
Total Amount Equity Funded by NWIL RMB 82.68millioii 52.00% 
5. Roadway No. 321 (Fengkai Section) in Zhaoqing, Guangdong 
Toll Road: Operating Stage 
Total Cost: RMB 283 million 
f ‘ u m b o � … 議 _ , 纖 , . : . : : ¾ 
a) Shareholders' Loans RMB 189 milHon 
i)NWIL (60%) RMB 113.4 milHon 
jj) Guangdong Highway-Bridge RMB 58.3065 million 
Construction Development 
Co. (30.85%) 
iii) Fengkai Highway Development RMB 9.8847 million 
Company (5.23%) 
iv) Zhaoqing Highway Development RMB 7.4088 milHon 
Ltd. (3.92%) 
b) Capital Contributions RMB 94 million 
i)NWIL (60%) RMB 56.4 million . 
jj) Guangdong Highway-Bridge RMB 28.999 million 
— Construction Development 
Co. (30.85%) 
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iii) Fengkai Highway Development RMB 4.9162 million 
Conyany (5.23%) 
iv) Zhaoqing Highway Development RMB 3.6848 million 
Ltd. (3.92%) 
Total Amount Equity Funded by NWIL RMB 169.8 million 60.00% 
6. Roadway No. 1964 (Zhaojiang Section) in Zhaoqing, Guangdong 
Toll Road: Operating Stage 
Total Cost: RMB 204 million 
[ _
 r ‘ 另 ^ 
I — I l l ^ ^ M 觀 凝 : » M E m ittfflkii mm%……. 
a) Shareholders, Loans RMB 124 miUion 6 0 . 7 8 % _ 
i) NWIL (80%) RMB 88 milHon 
jj) Gaoyao Highway Development RMB 18 million 
Company (10%) 
iii) Zhaoqing Highway Development RMB 18 million 
Ltd. (10%) 
b) Capital Contributions RMB 80 million 39.22%—— 
j) NWIL (80%) RMB 64 million 
jj) Gaoyao Highway Development RMB 8 million 
Company (10%) 
iii) Zhaoqing Highway Development RMB 8 million 
Ltd. (10%) 
Total Amount Equity Funded by NWIL RMB 152 million 74.51% 
7. Roadway No. 321 (Deqing Section) in Zhaoqing, Guangdong 
Toll Road: Operating Stage 
Total Cost: RMB 524,067,000 
_______ 
a^ Shariolders- Loans RMB 358.2 mi l l ion_68.35% 
i) NWIL (55%) RMB 197.01 milHon 
jj) Guangdong Highway-Bridge 107.46 million 
Construction Development .—— 
Company (30%) 
jjj) Guangdong Province Deqing 46.566 million 
Highway Development 
Company (13%) . 
iv) Zhaoqing Highway Development 7.164 million 
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Ltd. (2%) 
b) Capital Contributions RMB 165,867,000 31.64996% 
i) NWIL (55%) RMB 91,226,850 
ii) Guangdong Highway-Bridge RMB 49,760,100 
Constmction Development 
Company (30%) 
iii) Guangdong Province Deqing RMB 21,562,710 
Highway Development 
Company (13%) 
iv) Zhaoqing Highway Development RMB 3,317,340 
Ltd. (2%) 
Total Amount Equity Funded by NWIL RMB 288,236,850 55.00% 
8. Roadway No. 1960 (Guangning Section) in Zhaoqing, Guangdong 
Toll Road - Construction Stage 
Total Cost: RMB 270 milUon 
r m 思 浏 进 脑 a g tmstm 
a) Shareholders' Loans RMB 180 million 
j) NWIL (60%) RMB 72 million 
jj) Guangdong Highway-Bridge RMB 22.662 million 
Construction Development 
Company (12.59%) 
iii) Guangning Highway RMB 17.334 million 
Development Co. (9.63%) 
iv) Zhaoqing Highway Development RMB 32.004 million 
Ltd. (17.78%) 
b) Capital Contributions RMB 90 milHon 
j) NWIL (60%) ： RMB 54 million 
jj) Guangdong Highway-Bridge RMB 11.33 lmillion 
Construction Development 
Company (12.59%) 
jjj) Guangning Highway RMB 8.667 million 
Development Co. (9.63%) 
iv) Zhaoqing Highway Development RMB 16.002 million 
Ltd. (17.78%) 
Total Amount Equity Funded by NWIL RMB 872 million 20.00% 
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9. Wuhan Bridge Development, Wuhan 
Toll Road - Operating Stage 
Total Cost: 1,790 million 
a) Capital Contributions RMB1,764.5 million 98.58% 
i) NWIL (48.86%) RMB 860 million 
ii) Wuhan Bridge Construction 
Company (50%) RMB 884.337 million 
iii) Wuhan City Jiang Han Bridge RMB 8.136 miUion 
Economic and Development 
Company (0.46%) 
iv) Wuhan City Chang Jiang RMB 12.027 million 
Highway Bridge Removal 
and Reconstruction Development 
Company (0.68%) 
� BMB15.$ B I M q i i _ — — 
a) Revenues RMB 25.5 million 1.42% 
Total Amount Equity Funded by NWIL RMB 860 million 48.04% 
10. Wuhan Airport Expressway, Wuhan 
Toll Road - Operating Stage 
Total Cost: RMB 573 million 
制 H M B O - 讓 ％ 
ProjectEqwIyFtoancfeg BMB573mMon 100, 
a) Shareholders- Loans RMB513milHon 89.53 % 
i) NWIL (66.67%) US$60 million 
二 RMB 488 million 
ii)WACD (33.33%) RMB 25 million 
b) Capital Contributions RMB 60 million ^-47% 
i) NWIL (66.67%) RMB 40 milHon 
ii)WACD (33.33%) RMB 20 milHon 
Total Amount Equity Funded by NWIL RMB 872 million 20.00% 
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11. Zhujiang Power Station - Phase I 
Power Plant _ Operation Stage 
Total Cost: RMB2,700 million 
a) Syndicated Loan US$140 million 
b) Asian Development Bank (ADB) Loan US$ 50 million 
a) Shareholders' Loans RMB 435.34 million 
i) GDGC (50%) RMB 435.34 million 
b) Capital Contributions RMB 420 milHon 
I) New World through Try RMB 210 million 
Force (50%) 
ii) GDGC (50%) RMB 210 milHon 
R M B ' 2 偁 細 — 。 
a) Additional Shareholders' Loans RMB 260 million 9.63% 
I) New World through Try RMB 130 million 
Force (50%) 
ii) GDGC (50%) RMB 130 million 
Total Amount Equity Funded by NWIL RMB 340 million 12.59% 
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Appendix 5 Projects Joint Venture Contracts (NWIL) 
1. Guangzhou Northern Ring Road: The extension of the joint venture term will be on 
the basis of an extension of five months for every Rmb 10 million in currency exchange 
losses suffered by the Group 
2. Shenzhen-Huizhou Expressway (Huizhou Section) : The Huixin joint venture 
contract further provides that its term can be extended subject to relevant PRC 
approvals if(i) there is an economic loss due to force majeure; (ii) construction costs 
exceed the original estimate ofRmb270 million by more than 10%，or (iii), there is a 
devaluation of the Renminbi by more than 10% below the rate of US$1 = Rmb6.6. If 
(i) or (ii), the extension period will be determined by the Board of directors, and if (iii), 
will be based on the changes in the exchange rate. 
3. Guangzkou-anliai East-line E^ressway: the joint venture contract provides that 
the board of directors, subject to the appropriate governmental authorities' approval, 
may extend the term of the joint venture by: (i) one year for every Rmb320 million 
cost overrun in excess of the original estimate of Rmb5.8 billion of all the three phases 
of the East-line Expressway if the overrun exceeds the estimate by 5% or more, (n) 
one year for each additional year required to repay the joint venture partners' total 
contribution beyond the 12th year after the Opening Date, and (iii) if the joint venture 
is unable to maintain an 18% net annual return for each joint venture partner. 
4 Wuhan Airport Expressway: The JV contract provides that subject to approval 
from relevant PRC authorities the 20 year Period may be extended if construction 
costs exceed the original estimate of RMB490 million or the Group's average annual 
after tax return over the life of the contract period is below 18%. 
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Appendix 6 Stock Performance New World & NWBL 
Stock Price Performance 
4 0 - | 
Z 
3 5 r ^ 5 8 8 ' — 
« 
3 0 » — m — ‘ “ 
25 
• New World Infrastructure 
； 一 a — New World Development 
1 5 # • t _ 春 _ • 
10 
5 - -
0 -I 1 1 1 1 r 1 1 1 1 "« 1 1 1 
27/1 3/11/ 10/1 17/1 2471 1/12/ 8/12/ 15/1 22/1 29/1 5/1/9 12 /1 /19 /1 / 26/1/ 
0 /95 9 5 1/95 1/95 1/95 9 5 95 2/95 2/95 2/95 5 95 9 5 9 5 
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Appendix 7 Forecast Allowed Returns for HPI (RMB Millions) 
Adjusted Net Fixed Assets rANFA^ 9.068 10.206 12,436 20,777 
"Equity funding — 4,534 3,368 4,104 6,856 
Debt funding 4.534 6.838 8,332 13,921 
Return on equity funded ANFA 499 404 575 1 ,028_ 
Return on debt funded ANFA 317 479 583 9 7 4 _ 
Allowed return on ANFA 816 883 1,158 2 ,002_ 
Tccumulated CWIP 4,880 7,865 12,649 10,339 
Equity funding 878 2,360 3 , 7 9 ~ 3,102 
Debt fending 4.002 5,505 8,854 7,237 
Return on equity funded CWIP — 9 7 283 531 _ 4 6 5 _ 
Return on debt funded CWIP 280 385 620 _ 5 0 7 _ 
Allowed return on CWIP 377 668 1,151 972_ 
Total allowed retiirn _ 1，193 1,551 2,309 2 ,975_ 
"Growth rate 39.5% 30.1% 48.8% 28.8% 
(Source: Lehman Brothers) 
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Appendix 8 Annual Report of HPI as at December 31，1994 
I D � � 議 國 J a n , ^ M m ；[；'•'Jifly^Bec, J .... 
(Tn tliniisaiiHg RMR^ —— 
Income Statement Data 
"Operating Revenue 2,032,485 2,183,210 4,215,695 
Income before Financial 
Expenses 638,332 469,196 1,053,222 
Net Income 4 3 3 , 3 7 6 4 4 3 , 5 2 7 830,420 
Balance Sheet Data 
Total Assets 一 11,704,945 19.569,054 19,569,054 
"Current Liabilities 1,914,530 1,815,139 1,815,139 
Tong-Term Loans — 4.555.522 6,946,832 6,946,832 
Shareholders' Equity 5,234,893 10,807,083 10,807,083 
Total Liabilities and 
Shareholders' Equity 11,704,945 19,569,054 丨 19,569,054 
(Source: Prospectus of Huaneng Power International, Inc. and Dow Jones) 
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Appendix 9 Estimated Cost (HPI Projects) 
Estimated construction and related start-up costs (including interest during 
construction) for the planned power plants for the period 1994 to 1999 
麵 狐 h p ^ 紗 辦 i m f 1996 \ 脚 7 � v m i m -
Dalian Phase H Expansion — 757 1,388 1,508 721 194 
Dandong Power Plant 135 689 1,357 1,579 773 207 
Fuzhou Phase H Expansion — 757 1,388 1,508 721 194 
Jinling Power Plant - 1,300 1,499 2,399 2,902 1,600 
Nantong Phase H Expansion — . 757 1,388 1,508 721 194 
Shangan Phase H Expansion 364 628 769 454 14 — 
Shantou Coal-fired Plant 1,450 1,212 799 140 
Shantou Phase II Expansion 1 9 8 ^ 3 8 0 
“ 1,949 6,100 8,587 9,096 6,050 3,769 
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Appendix 10 Liabilities & Shareholders Equity (HPI) 
As at June 30,1994. 
Immediately Reconciliation Immediately 
prior to the items following the 
organization reorganization 
(RMB) (RMB) (RMB) 
(amount in thousands) 
Liabilities: 
Current Liabilities; 
Current portion of long-term loans 
Foreign bank loam 734,512 (734,512) (al) ---
Government loans 220,938 (220,938) (al) 一 
Current portion of long-term , , , , , , — 955 450 (al) 955,450 shareholders9 loans ' v J 
Other current liabilities 959,080 9 5 9 , _ 
Total Current Liabilities 1-914.530 ^ 9 1 4 ^ 5 3 0 
Lou 拜-Term Loans; 
Foreign bank loans 3,541,258 (3,541,258) (a2) -
Government loans 1，370，171 (434,625) (b) -
(935,546) (a2) 
Advance from HIPDC 78,718 (78,718) (a2) -
Long-Term shareholders' loans — 4,555,522 (a2) 4,555,522 
Total Long-Term Loans 4,990,147 4 , 5 5 5 , 5 2 2 
Total Liabilities 6,904,677 6 , 4 7 0 , 0 5 2 
Shareholders' Eamtv: 
Qass A ordinary shares 2,630,966 (c) 3，750，000 
434,625 (b) 
684,409 (c) 
Additiomd paid-in capital 1,484,893 (c) 1,484,893 
Owner's Equity 684,409 (684,409) (c) _ -
Total Shareholders' Equity 684,409 5’234，893 
Total Liabilities and Shareholders' 
Equity 7,589,086 U， 7 0 4 , 9 4 5 
Notes, (al) and (a2) refer reclassification of the remaining outstanding loans from local 
governments, bank loans and central government loans on-lent by HIPDC into shareholders' 
loans, (b) is an adjustment reflecting the retirement of a portion of the local government loans 
in exchange for the Company's equity: (c) are the necessary reconciliations made to reflect the 
capitalization of the Company, including the elimination of the owner's equity account which 
existed prior to the formation of the Company as well as the recording of the issued share 
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